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Chapter I- Introduction 
In a 2011 interview with Forbes magazine, the founder of the Internet, Vint Cerf, was 
asked if his creation had fulfilled his expectations. Choosing to discuss the power of the Internet, 
Cerf responded: “Information flow is what the Internet is about. Information sharing is power. If 
you don't share your ideas, smart people can't do anything about them, and you'll remain 
anonymous and powerless” (Karlgaard 2011). Within Cerf’s words is the underlying connection 
between the sharing of information and power. The hyper-connectedness of modern society has 
redefined the nature of information sharing. In this new world, ideas can flourish with incredible 
speed. Individuals hold the power to mobilize and advocate for change on an unprecedented 
scale, presenting a new challenge to centralized power (Heimans & Timms 2017). However, the 
fallacy in this line of thinking is the assumption that this connection is inherently beneficial for 
the individual. Instead, the reality is that sites facilitating a connection between Internet users can 
actually be used to reinforce centralized power structures. Despite evidence from other countries 
that online democratic tools, and the Internet more generally, have forced regimes to decrease 
their control over the public, the strength and ability of Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) 
to exert authoritarian public policy remains strong (Howard & Hussain 2013; Oliver & Ostwald 
2018). Thus, my research will seek to answer the question: Why is the Singaporean government 
able to continue to implement authoritarian public policy despite the emergence of Internet 
technologies allowing for increased online participation and political engagement? 
I. Argument 
My research suggests that through the strategic use of online practices typically 
associated with democracy, such as increased participation and political engagement, the PAP is 
able to reinforce its own authoritarian powers. This is done by providing a channel for Internet 
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users (hereafter referred to as netizens) to engage with Singaporean public policy in new ways 
that capitalize on individuals’ increasing desire to participate online (Heimans & Timms 2018). 
These new opportunities for engagement have restructured the nature of participation to 
incorporate a larger base of Singaporean citizens. However, despite these new modes of 
participation, the PAP can still put forth a singular political narrative centered on advancing the 
party’s policy initiatives. 
In doing so, the party works to reinforce a centralized political narrative through 
decentralized channels of communication. This political narrative centers on the idea that, while 
Singapore has experienced tremendous economic and societal success in the last 50 years, many 
Singaporeans view these successes as constantly at risk of falling apart (Mutalib 2000; Wong & 
Huang 2010).  Furthermore, Singaporean citizens have come to adopt an opinion that paints the 
People’s Action Party as the inherent cause of the nation’s success (Tan 2014). The PAP has 
been able to take advantage of this viewpoint and in turn paint themselves as the hero, any 
opposition as the villain, and the Singaporean citizen as the immature victim, ever vulnerable to 
outside influence (Mutalib 2000). While the Internet has provided an avenue to contradict the 
Singaporean political narrative, the PAP has carefully channeled the power of increased 
engagement in the online public sphere to continue to engage in authoritarian policy initiatives. 
In this thesis, I explore three sites— STOMP, The Straits Times and Change.org—and 
the ways in which they are utilized by the regime to advance public policy. STOMP and 
Change.org are both sites that embody the participatory nature of the Internet by facilitating user 
engagement and allowing for peer-to-peer information sharing. The Straits Times is a media 
outlet that takes a top-down approach to sharing information wherein journalists curate news 
stories that are then posted online to the website. As I explore, each of these sites plays a crucial 
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role in advancing the regime’s public policy given the new hyper-connectedness of Internet 
users. 
Using 21st century technologies, the PAP is able to shape public policy in two ways. First, 
through the creation of websites centered on user participation and engagement, the PAP allows 
netizens to engage with public policy in artificial, but powerful ways. That is to say, the PAP has 
created sites that allow for netizens to show support for the regime without allowing for any 
dissent. Sites such as the Straits Times Online Mobile Print (STOMP) have provided 
Singaporeans with an avenue to engage with the PAP’s political agenda that, in turn, reinforces 
its traditional power structures. Second, The Straits Times and Change.org allow the PAP to 
highlight instances of online support for the regime that exist, while ignoring dissent. The use of 
Change.org petitions, in collaboration with the pro-PAP media outlet The Straits Times, creates a 
tool for illustrating popular support for public policy when it best serves the regime (“Global 
Intelligence Files” 2010). I explore these dynamics in Chapters III and IV. In Chapter V, I 
explore a singular case to demonstrate how the regime both artificially creates public support and 
capitalizes on pre-existing examples of it to advance public policy. Each of these points will be 
explored in greater detail using a methodology discussed below. 
II. Context 
There are many bodies of research surrounding authoritarian control in the political 
sphere in the 20th century (Peleg 1994; Husák 2018), and the 21st century (King et al. 2013; 
Gehlbach 2011). As Peleg argues, power centers on the ability to prevent the flow of information 
(1994). In the past, Singapore has been able to do this by regulating the publications of books, 
movies and other forms of media (Tan 2018). However, in the 21st century, new modes of 
information sharing have emerged wherein individuals hold the power to share information on a 
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peer-to-peer basis (Heimans & Timms 2018; Roberts 2018). This has allowed for political 
participation through information sharing on a global scale (Heimans & Timms 2018; Ferdinand 
2000). Research surrounding this idea suggests that authoritarian forms of government will be 
overpowered by the increasingly robust platform for free speech that is the Internet (Howard & 
Muzammil 2013). This idea is supported by the fall of many powerful individuals from Harvey 
Weinstein with the #MeToo movement (Heimans & Timms 2018), to President Hosni Mubarak 
in Egypt during the Arab Spring (Clarke 2019). However, despite these expectations, the PAP’s 
authoritarian policy agenda has been able to withstand the democratic tools made possible by the 
Internet. In fact, as I explore throughout this thesis, Singaporean citizens will go as far as to use 
these technologies to reinforce the government’s autocratic power. 
Thus, this thesis centers on the PAP’s ability to advance policy initiatives that reinforce 
authoritarian power in the 21st century. Peters (2003) defines public policy as the activity that 
governments engage in for the purpose of changing their economy or society. For the purpose of 
my research, I use this definition when referring to public policy decisions taken by the PAP. 
Beyond this, when referring to public policy advancement, I expand on Lascoumes and Le Gales 
(2007) definition of public policy instrumentation. That is, the devices utilized with the generic 
purpose of carrying a concrete political or social concept into implementation (Lascoumes & Le 
Gales 2007). This research builds off of this definition to define public policy advancement as 
the efforts taken by governments to implement public policy. Public policy advancement by the 
PAP aims to avoid resistance from Singaporean citizens while still entrenching authoritarian 
power. Thus, the PAP must simultaneously incorporate popular support, and use such support to 
centralize its power. 
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For this research, it is important to understand how public policy advancement entrenches 
authoritarian power in Singapore. As scholars (Wong & Huang 2010) argue, the Singaporean 
regime has a surprisingly shallow depth of legitimacy in the city-state. While the regime has 
maintained a long degree of support (Tan 2014), its ability to maintain legitimacy rests on an 
exchange relation between Singaporean citizens and the party (Wong & Huang 2010). However, 
this relation emphasizes that the regime will provide security and prosperity for its citizens in 
exchange for political legitimacy (Wong & Huang 2010). This relationship must be constantly 
maintained in Singapore to ensure that the regime is able to maintain authoritarian power in the 
face of an increasingly mobilized base of citizens (Tan 2014). As I explore, much of the regime’s 
public policy works to ensure feelings of both security and prosperity in Singapore. However, 
when the PAP enacts new public policy, it simultaneously mends the exchange relation it 
maintains with its citizens and reinforces its authoritarian power. 
III. Methodology 
 The methodology for my thesis involves the collection of qualitative data from each of 
the three aspects of my argument outlined above. I collected and analyzed news articles from 
STOMP and The Straits Times and online petitions from Change.org relating to PAP public 
policy. This analysis draws conclusions about the ability for the PAP to continue to enforce an 
authoritarian policy agenda as practices characteristic of democracy emerge online.   
 First, I begin my qualitative analysis by exploring the Straits Times Online Mobile Print 
(STOMP). STOMP is an organization that allows citizens to create Singaporean news stories and 
share them with the nation. In conducting research on STOMP, I examine the English as it is 
Broken column, an extension of the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) that sought to 
encourage Singaporeans to adopt Standard English over Singaporean English (or Singlish). As 
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will be explored, this column encouraged individuals to actively participate in a political agenda 
put forth by the PAP. In analyzing English as it is Broken, I pull a series of questions and 
answers taken from the column to describe the ways in which the PAP reshaped the nature of 
participation surrounding SGEM. While the column was discontinued in the late 2000s, two 
best-selling books have been published under the same name. Both of these books, filled entirely 
with questions and answers taken directly from the column, will provide the foundation for the 
data in this section. What I find is that the party works to both increase and reshape participation 
on English as it is Broken by providing a channel for netizens to take the movement in its own 
direction. 
 Second, I explore the platform Change.org and the way that it is used to illustrate popular 
support for regime policy on The Straits Times. Change.org, widely used in Singapore, is 
perhaps the most direct example of democratic organizing on the Internet. The site allows 
individuals to create and sign petitions in a quick and easy fashion (“Change.org” 2020). In 
analyzing Change.org petitions, I search for those that address the government directly in both 
support and opposition of the regime surrounding the banning of the Swedish heavy metal band 
Watain. The revoking of Watain’s performance license was highly publicized as some argued it 
set back free speech in the nation while others stated the band’s lyrics were harmful to the 
Christian faith and, as such, should be censored (Chan 2019). As I explore, not all of the 
Change.org petitions are in support of the government’s decision to prohibit the band from 
performing, however the PAP is able to utilize The Straits Times to highlight support for certain 
petitions, allowing others to live in the margins of the Internet.  This case study is combined with 
data collected using The Google Custom Search REST API—a program that can be used to scan 
the web for news articles programmatically—to demonstrate how the PAP utilizes The Straits 
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Times to selectively draw attention to certain petitions and ignore others. When comparing the 
Change.org petitions with previous research surrounding public policy in Singapore, I will 
provide analysis as to how Singaporeans have come to view and engage with the PAP’s political 
agenda in the digital era. What I find is that the party highlights specific Change.org petitions on 
The Straits Times that exemplify popular support while ignoring petitions that exemplify 
opposition towards government policy. 
 Finally, I explore the interconnected nature of STOMP, The Straits Times, and 
Change.org in advancing public policy. Here, my methodology is similar to the previous data 
chapters. I explore the use of each site in advancing public policy surrounding the banning of 
personal mobility devices (e-Scooters, e-Bikes, etc.) from footpaths throughout the city-state. 
Each site plays a definitive role in working to ensure that the ban of personal mobility devices 
from footpaths gains popular support. In order to explore this concept further, I use The Google 
Custom Search REST API to scan both STOMP and The Straits Times for mention of personal 
mobility devices in the year 2019, when the discussion to ban the devices was at its height. From 
there, I analyze several of the articles to demonstrate how STOMP generates popular support for 
regime public policy, while The Straits Times uses pre-existing instances of popular support on 
Change.org to further the party’s policy initiatives. Through this, I find that the regime 
simultaneously works to generate popular support, and also works to capitalize on pre-existing 
examples of it, to advance public policy initiatives. 
IV. Outline 
 Throughout this thesis, I work to show why the PAP is able to continue to implement 
authoritarian public policy despite increased engagement and democratic participation facilitated 
through the Internet. First, I provide a starting point for this thesis by addressing previous 
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research in this field. The previous studies I pull from can be broadly defined in three main 
categories: (1) authoritarian regimes in the 21st century, (2) the shift in information flow in the 
21st century, and (3) public policy advancement in Singapore in the 21st century. In the third 
chapter, I analyze STOMP to show the power of social news sites in influencing public policy. 
The following chapter explores Change.org and The Straits Times as platforms for highlighting 
popular support for the banning of Watain. In the fifth chapter, I analyze how STOMP, The 
Straits Times and Change.org are used in lockstep to advance an authoritarian policy agenda. 















Chapter II- Literature Review 
I. Introduction 
In order to understand why the People’s Action Party (PAP) is able to continue to 
advance any authoritarian policy agenda despite the growing presence of Internet tools that 
facilitate democratic participation, it is first necessary to understand the context in which 
authoritarianism, information sharing and Singaporean policy making exists in the 21st century. 
The end of the Cold War brought a paradigm shift in authoritarianism. Likewise, the digital age 
ushered in new technologies that led to a shift in information flow. Both of these changes have 
dramatically altered Singapore’s approach to policy making in the 21st century. Thus, the 
foundation for my research connects with the following categories of political science literature: 
(1) authoritarian governance in the Post-Cold War era, (2) the hyper-connection of individuals in 
the digital age, and (3) authoritarian policy advancement (as defined in Chapter I) in Singapore. 
The first two categories address the political and technological systems and their changes in the 
late 20th and 21st century, whereas the final category of literature can be viewed as the resulting 
system for advancing policy in Singapore that emerged out of the first two transformations.  
II. New Forms of Authoritarian Regimes 
In the 21st century there are essentially two schools of thought concerning 
authoritarianism. The first argues that regimes exclude practices typical of democratic 
institutions—such as separation of powers, citizen participation and majority rule—in favor of 
implementing overtly authoritarian policies (Doubek 2018; Ambrosio 2018; Kneuer & 
Demmelhuber 2016). The second argues that autocratic regimes use pseudo-democratic 
institutions that appear to advance democracy, to reinforce autocratic control (Ezrow 2018; 
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Gagné 2015). Singapore seems to fit well in this latter description. However, as examples of both 
regime types exist, this section of my literature review will address the current research in both 
areas of authoritarian study. 
 
Removing the Mask of Democracy 
 In the past decade, the form of authoritarian governance that existed throughout the Cold 
War has experienced a fierce resurgence (Ambrosio 2018). Nations have become more overtly 
authoritarian in the past decade (“Freedom House” 2010; “Freedom House 2019). Turkey, for 
example, experienced a fierce decline in both political freedom and civil liberties between 2010 
and 2019, sliding from a characterization of “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in 2018 (“Freedom 
House” 2010; “Freedom House” 2019). In a similar sense, Thailand has also become 
significantly less free, experiencing a downward trend in democratic freedom resulting in a re-
characterization from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in 2015 (“Freedom House” 2019; “Freedom 
House” 2019). Nations such as India, Hungary and Egypt have all followed similar trends. 
However, these trends do not exist in isolation for a select number of countries. Rather, when 
examined in aggregate, all nations over the past decade have become increasingly more 
authoritarian. In 2019, for example, 64 nations were measured to have experienced democratic 
decline, with only 37 experiencing democratic gains (“Freedom House” 2020). Figure 2.1 
illustrates the global deterioration of democracy over the past fourteen years. In this context, it 




Figure 2.1: Number of Countries with Democratic Advancements and Declines since 2005 
(“Freedom House” 2020) 
 
As Ambrosio (2018) argues, whether it is through abolishing term limits, violently 
cracking down on peaceful protests, or creating a dynasty by grooming one’s children to govern, 
“the mask has clearly slipped and autocrats are now far less concerned about keeping up the 
pretenses of democracy” (122). Ambrosio further illustrates his argument by referencing Viktor 
Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, who in 2014, criticized the foundation of liberal 
democracy by openly declaring that he supports building an illiberal state such as those that exist 
in China, Russia and Turkey. Such rhetoric is indicative of a shifting tide in world politics that 
welcomes autocratic rule. Still, while Singapore may be a recognizably authoritarian government 
from the outside, within the city-state, the PAP takes care to create a political sphere that 
encourages democratic participation in the political process. Both online and offline, 
Singaporeans have a greater ability to vote, speak or otherwise engage in politics than in more 
overtly authoritarian regimes around the world. As a result, the PAP takes a different approach to 
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policy making than other authoritarian regimes with little regard for democratic institutions. The 
party must make decisions with more concern for citizen reception as the voter base is slightly 
more mobilized (Tan 2014). 
 Furthermore, as Kneuer and Demmelhuber (2016) argue, the political context that allows 
Orbán to openly support authoritarianism is permitted through Authoritarian Gravity Centers 
(ACGs) that can be attributed with the growing prominence of authoritarian systems in the 
modern age. As the authors explore, regimes actively export autocratic principles on a regional 
level. These principles can then be used as a conceptual playbook for other governments to 
follow (Kneuer & Demmelhuber 2016). That is to say, as more states follow the overtly 
authoritarian path, the regimes will create an established reference group that permits 
authoritarianism in the modern era (Ambrosio 2018). As the authors argue, with the emergence 
of more overtly authoritarian action in recent years under governments in Russia, Iran or 
Venezuela, neighboring nations are given ideas and resources to further their already non-
democratic governments into authoritarianism (Kneuer & Demmelhuber 2016). This concept, 
known as the demonstration effect, explains how authoritarian developments in one place will 
often act as a catalyst to those in another (Ahmed 2017). However, as the rest of the world has 
shifted further towards authoritarianism over the past decade, Singapore has maintained nearly 
the exact same degree of freedom in the political sphere (“Freedom House” 2010; “Freedom 
House” 2019). Such a reality suggests that Singapore has no intention of either relinquishing or 
tightening its control over its citizens. Instead, the People’s Action Party attempts to retain its 





Authoritarianism with a Hint of Democracy  
Hybrid regimes—or those that combine democratic and autocratic principles—have 
become more common in the post-Cold War era. However, Singapore stands unique among 
others in that the nation was established as a pseudo-democratic state in the 1960s, and has 
continued the same degree of control throughout the PAP’s reign (“Freedom House” 2019; Tan 
2016). As Gagné (2015) argues, hybrid regimes combine democratic and autocratic traits to 
maintain a system of strict control while at the same time presenting a democratic façade to the 
world. In this sense, hybrid regimes present a certain degree of legitimacy to citizens (and, 
perhaps, the international community) while allowing autocratic rulers to maintain dominance. 
Hybrid Regimes have existed since the 1950s, but they have grown in incredible number in 
recent years (Gagné 2015). However, hybrid regimes are still somewhat more beholden to their 
citizen base than other authoritarian regimes. The lack of staunch repression, and the lessened 
restriction of dissenting voices pose new challenges to a hybrid regime’s ability to advance 
public policy. 
As Ezrow (2018) argues, this shift towards hybridization is marked with the near 
extinction of a specific aspect of authoritarianism: totalitarianism. At the turn of the century, this 
form of absolute governance began to fade until only North Korea remained (Ezrow 2018). 
Instead, new forms of control have emerged allowing for the perception of democracy under 
authoritarianism. While democratic institutions such as voting, freedom of speech, or 
governmental checks and balances appear to be in place, they are often illegitimate. In Russia, 
for example, elections take place, however they are often considered unfree and unfair (Dewan 
2018).  These modern autocratic governments, characterized as hybrid regimes, have become 
more experienced in using media, electoral processes, and the economic sphere creatively to 
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their advantage. Rather than exercising complete control over the economy, for example, hybrid 
regimes may encourage neoliberal practices while still enforcing staunch regulation when 
necessary to maintain power (Ezrow 2018). This form of governance is indicative of Singapore’s 
political past and present. The regime’s closed political access, coupled with an open economic 
sphere is a marker of its position in the 21st century as a hybrid regime (Ademmer, Langbein & 
Börzel 2019). 
It is important to recognize, however, that Singapore stands unique among other hybrid 
regimes in the 21st century. While other regimes have gradually transformed their political 
institutions (Ambrosio 2018; Ezrow 2018) in a marked shift towards populist authoritarianism 
(Muddle & Kaltwasser 2017), Singapore has instead maintained many of its political institutions. 
This can be seen as a staunch contrast with other regimes that attempt to delegitimize judicial 
and legislative areas of government in order to centralize power (“Ecuador Bucks the 
Authoritarian Trend” 2018). Instead, Singapore has upheld the legitimacy of these institutions. In 
this way, the nation has not gotten definitively more authoritarian or democratic (“Freedom 
House 2019). Instead, the regime has firmly maintained its position as a hybrid regime 
throughout its reign. 
To elaborate, as Moriesen (2014) explores, Singapore can be viewed through a variety of 
different lenses in terms of its political structure. However, the characterization that Moriesen 
uses, and the one that this paper will utilize, is that Singapore is a politically illiberal and 
economically liberal system (Moriesen 2014). On the basis that the PAP does not have any 
substantial opposition, does not allow for free press, marginalizes any existing opposition, and 
holds little tolerance for opposing views, this thesis will refer to Singapore as an authoritarian or 
autocratic state (Moriesen 2014). It is important to remember, however, that Singapore does have 
20 
 
a neoliberal economic sphere. This economic disposition has created new complexities for the 
PAP in the global sphere. As the nation continues to grow in global markets, the PAP is 
simultaneously working to maintain its authoritarian power (Moriesen 2014). In doing so, it has 
been forced to provide some concessions to Singaporean citizens. Censorship over the Internet, 
for example, is far looser than in other authoritarian regimes (“Freedom House” 2019). Citizens 
hold the ability to participate in large numbers online in such a way that allows for both popular 
support and dissent against the regime to emerge. However, for the reasons stated above, 
Singapore can still be labeled as an authoritarian power. My research shows, the PAP has begun 
to take a new approach to advancing its own public policy that capitalizes on the new political 
dynamic emerging in the globalized world. That is, the PAP has begun to capitalize on new 
avenues of popular engagement online to ensure that popular support for regime policy emerges. 
This in turn allows the regime to utilize tools that facilitate democracy to paradoxically reinforce 
autocratic powers. 
III. Information and Connection in the 21st Century 
As digital technology has continued to progress, so too have the modes for spreading and 
sharing of information. Throughout the 20th century, information moved in a top-down fashion 
from state-owned or private news groups (TV, newspaper and radio) to individual consumers. 
This system had few peer-based communication methods for individuals (Roberts 2018). Thus, 
in order to disseminate information en masse, large scale media outlets were required. In 
authoritarian regimes, this allowed for a singular political narrative to be put forth by simply 
controlling the media. However, with the birth of the Internet in the late 20th and early 21st 
century, new methods of sharing information have allowed this traditional flow of news from 
media agencies to consumers to be subverted (Roberts 2018). Originally, new technology led 
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scholars to believe that the Internet would spark a new wave of democracy where the 
liberalization of information sharing would lead to a liberalization of politics (Diamond & 
Plattner 2012; Howard & Hussein 2013). However, as the 21st century has continued and a 
resurgence of authoritarian forms of governance has emerged, many have come to realize that 
the Internet can be just as much a catalyst for autocracy as democracy (Heimans & Timms 2017; 
“Freedom House” 2019). As I explore throughout this thesis, the PAP is able to use increased 
online participation in a seemingly paradoxical way to advance authoritarian public policy. 
As Howard and Hussein (2013) argue, the Internet was an influential source in 
connecting individuals through Tunisia and Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring. As unrest in 
both nations began to grow, collective action through Facebook ignited a significant portion of 
the population, rallying them around a collective issue that could then be translated to the streets. 
In Egypt, the death of Khaled Said sparked online protests and the creation of the Facebook 
group “We are all Khaled Said” (Howard & Hussein 2013). It was on this Facebook group that 
the initial call for protests in Cairo’s Tahir Square was made (Ghonim 2015). This suggests that 
the Internet holds the power to engage citizens in political movements that are capable of 
challenging centralized powers. However, when such power is challenged, autocratic 
governments do not simply yield the ground. 
In Tunisia and Egypt, as the protests continued to grow, both countries eventually took 
down the Internet in an effort to suppress dissent (Howard & Hussein 2013). Then, in perhaps 
the most devastating example of the Streisand Effect1 in modern governance, the act of cutting 
the Internet caused more people to take to the streets to attempt to get more information. This 
                                                          
1 The Streisand Effect refers to a phenomenon whereby an attempt to censor has the unintended consequence of 
publicizing the information more widely. Originally named after Barbra Streisand, who, while trying to suppress 
photos of her residence in Malibu, California, inadvertently drew more attention to them. 
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caused the protests to then grow in considerable size as those who were indifferent about the 
issue were forced into the streets to simply find information (Howard & Hussein 2013). In this 
case, Internet tools facilitating political engagement overpowered centralized power structures 
and brought the ability of authoritarian governments to maintain power in the digital age into 
question.  
The events during the Arab Spring suggest that the power of autocratic governments 
weakens as a result of the Internet (Howard & Hussein 2013). In particular, the revolutions that 
took place in Tunisia and Egypt appear to demonstrate the idea that the Internet’s hyper-
connected nature will become an unstoppable liberalizing force, capable of toppling entrenched 
dictatorships around the world. However, the rise of authoritarian regimes in the past decade has 
demonstrated that this is a fallacy (“Freedom House” 2019). In Singapore, the PAP has firmly 
remained in power despite many rapid advancements in the tech industry (Ortmann 2018). This 
fact suggests that the Internet is not the harbinger to democracy that some had hoped. Instead, as 
I show, it is a tool for facilitating increased participation in the political sphere that can give 
power to democratic or autocratic forms of governance.  
Through this discussion, it becomes clear that the shift in information flow as a result of 
the Internet is not inherently liberating. While some scholars such as Larry Diamond (2010) have 
used the term liberation technology to describe the Internet, the idea of the platform as a 
harbinger of democracy is coming into contest. Perhaps, as Diamond presents in a later work 
with Marc Plattner (2012), a better term is accountability technology. That is to say, technology 
that provides a tool for checking and monitoring others within the political sphere (Diamond & 
Plattner 2012). The emergence of cell phone cameras and YouTube, for example, allowed for a 
grainy video of a Tunisian street vendor’s sacrificial protest to spark political revolutions 
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throughout the region (Diamond & Plattner 2012). However, at the same time, similar 
technologies give power to current regimes such as China’s Communist Party. The use of facial 
recognition technologies, for example, have allowed the Chinese government to facilitate 
surveillance on its own people in an unprecedented way (Bai 2019). As I explore, in Singapore, 
many Internet platforms embody the essential difference between accountability and liberation 
technology. Sites like STOMP, The Straits Times and Change.org are founded on the principle of 
participation associated with democracy. However, their outcomes are often less than 
democratic. Instead, they allow the PAP to use netizen engagement to advance authoritarian 
public policy and subsequently reinforce centralized power. 
Scholars have often given focus to the role of technology to facilitate democratic action 
(Heimans & Timms 2017; Howard & Hussein 2013). Yet the methodology, and by whom the 
technology is being used, determines whether said technology acts as a tool for democratic 
change, or a handmaiden for authoritarianism (Ghonim 2015; Cadwalladr 2019; Heimans & 
Timms 2017). As Heimans and Timms (2018) argue in New Power, participation and connection 
facilitated through the Internet is not inherently intertwined with outcomes favorable to 
democracy. Rather, technology simply allows for hyper-connectivity. The result of such 
connection is left up to those that are in a position to harness its power. In this sense, platforms 
encouraging democratic practices such as Facebook, Twitter, and those I examine in this thesis 
hold the potential to reinforce autocratic power. Sites such as STOMP and Change.org embody 
the participatory nature that has characterized the Internet in the digital age. While both sites are 
notably democratic in allowing all Singaporeans to share information, they frequently encourage 
authoritarian principles in a way that appears to be founded on popular support. This thesis will 
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explore how these online sites facilitating citizen participation can be used to advance 
authoritarian public policy.  
IV. Policy Advancement in Singapore in the 21st Century 
The strategies that the PAP uses to implement authoritarian public policy is the focus of 
this section. As Wong and Huang (2010) have noted, Singapore’s liberal economic sphere, 
coupled with its illiberal political sphere has caused many to question how the regime is able to 
maintain power. The authors argue that while the regime enjoys a large degree of support in the 
nation, the depth of its legitimacy is shallow (Wong & Huang 2010). The fact that the PAP has 
maintained political legitimacy despite economic liberalization and globalization is due to a 
relationship between citizens and the regime wherein the latter provides security and prosperity 
for Singaporean citizens in return for receiving political legitimacy (Wong & Huang 2010). Even 
when the relationship is stable, it requires attention to ensure that the legitimacy of the regime is 
maintained (Wong & Huang 2010). As I explore throughout this thesis, much of the PAP’s 
attempts to advance public policy are founded on ensuring that the exchange relation between 
citizens and the regime remains strong. 
As scholars have noted (Tan 2014; Ong & Tim 2014), since the 2011 elections, the PAP 
has taken a different approach to engaging in new policy decisions. In 2011, the PAP gained the 
smallest percentage of votes since the general elections of 1968. The regime only garnered 
60.14% of the popular vote (Ong & Tim 2014). As a result, the oppositional Worker’s Party 
garnered 8 of the 101 seats in the Singaporean parliament, the largest for any oppositional party 
in Singapore since the 1968 election (Ong & Tim 2014). While the party still held a firm 
majority in government, the 2011 electoral results led to a new political climate that many have 
come to refer to as “the new normal” (Ong & Tim 2014; Tan 2014; Wee 2015). The phrase 
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reflects a heightened sense of vulnerability felt by the PAP in the face of a newly mobilized and 
politically active electorate (Ong & Tim 2014; Wee 2015). The “new normal” has, in turn, lead 
to a dramatically different stance taken by the PAP on policy decisions in the 2010s. In many 
cases, the PAP has engaged in more cautious policy decisions with an emphasis on garnering 
public support rather than going against the Singaporean public and engaging in an overhaul of 
current policy. 
As Tan (2014) notes, performance is a key aspect of the PAP’s longstanding authoritarian 
rule. The economic and social success of Singapore, characterized by high growth rates and the 
formation of a middle-class, linked the regime with Singapore’s success story (Tan 2014). This 
in turn provided a degree of credibility for the regime’s policy decisions. However, this success 
has also subsequently driven public expectations of the government to incredibly high levels 
(Tan 2014). This fact, coupled with the increased mobilization of the electorate has brought the 
regime’s political power into contest (Tan 2014). However, the PAP did not simply yield the 
ground. Instead, the party began to attempt to find credible solutions to policy problems that 
allowed it to regain its political hegemony (Tan 2014). In this thesis, I show how the party works 
to encourage and reshape the nature of political participation in order to channel the power of 
online democratic action to enact new policy. 
The above research suggests that the PAP’s power has come into contest in recent years 
and this challenge has caused the regime to engage in new methods for enacting public policy. 
While some (Wong & Huang 2010) have argued that the depth of the regime’s legitimacy was 
shallow before the 2011 elections, there is no doubt that the regime faced a serious threat to 
power at the start of the 2010s (Tan 2014). This forced the regime to develop new methods for 
policy advancement that accounted for an increasingly mobilized voter base. As I explore in the 
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subsequent chapters of this thesis, the emergence of online tools facilitating netizen participation 
holds the potential to greatly threaten the regime’s power. However, the PAP is still able to 
reinforce its centralized power by engaging in policy advancement that capitalizes on, and even 
works to facilitate, such mobilization. 
V. Concluding Notes 
The above literature seeks to create a foundation for exploring policy making in Singapore 
in the 21st century. The shift in information flow, as well as the changing tides of 
authoritarianism have had dramatic effects on the PAP’s ability to advance public policy in the 
21st century. More generally, the political and technological transitions that have emerged in the 
modern era have given way to a new dynamic between authoritarian regimes and their citizens. 
As is apparent with the Arab Spring, this new dynamic may cause friction between traditional 
autocratic power structures and the newly connected citizen base. However, it will not inherently 
lead to democracy. Instead, governments have begun to change their tactics for exerting control. 
Rather than govern with a heavy hand, regimes such as the PAP have opted to capitalize on the 
increased connection of individuals to encourage their own agendas. As I argue in the remaining 
chapters, this allows the regime to create a new system for encouraging and implementing 
authoritarian public policy in such a way that operates on the same peer-to-peer basis as the 







Chapter III- Artificially Creating User Engagement 
I. Introduction 
In working to understand the PAP utilizes sites that appear to facilitate democracy to 
advance authoritarian public policy, this chapter explores how the PAP engages with the Straits 
Times Online Mobile Print (STOMP). Specifically, this chapter explores the utilization of 
STOMP in garnering support for the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) as an example of 
the Singaporean regime’s attempts to make use of the Internet to advance its own public policy. 
Throughout this chapter, I argue that the authoritarian People’s Action Party (PAP) utilizes 
STOMP to facilitate mass participation and engagement surrounding its public policy. This has 
the effect of creating a system in which increased participation from netizens is used to advance 
autocratic power. 
To demonstrate my argument, this chapter analyzes the Speak Good English Movement 
(SGEM), a government public policy initiative launched in 2000. Through this initiative, the 
PAP intended to encourage the population to adopt westernized “Standard English” and reject 
the Singaporean dialect of English, colloquially known as “Singlish” (Bruthiaux 2010).  
Specifically, I analyze the beginning of the movement and its centralized approach to 
encouraging Singaporeans to “speak good English” wherein participation was limited to the 
leaders of the movement. I then contrast this approach with the regime’s later attempts to 
decentralize power and encourage participation from a wider base of Singaporeans. These 
attempts to decentralize power within the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) will be the 
focus of this chapter. Most importantly for this project, this section analyzes the online forum 
known as English as it is Broken. The column, created in conjunction with the People’s Action 
Party (PAP) and the Ministry of Education, was a definitive attempt to encourage increased 
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participation in authoritarian public policy. Initially started as a weekly print column in the 
Straits Times, the English as it is Broken forum launched in 2008 as a regular feature on STOMP 
(Tai Ann & Soh 2010). STOMP’s English as it is Broken forum allowed individual citizens to 
share and create stories by taking photos or sending written information to STOMP via 
WhatsApp, SMS or through the site (Tai Ann & Soh 2010). In analyzing the forum, this chapter 
shows how the PAP is able to continue to enact authoritarian public policy as tools allowing for 
democratic participation begin to emerge on the Internet. In essence, the PAP uses a site 
associated with democratic practices to advance an authoritarian ideology centered on 
controlling culture, and more specifically language, in Singapore. 
Within the context of Singapore, the ability to advance public policy online is apparent 
with the Straits Times Online Mobile Print (STOMP). The site is a subsidiary of the Singaporean 
media conglomerate Singapore Press Holdings. STOMP encourages the sharing of information 
between individuals in a fashion indicative of the peer-to-peer nature of sharing information 
discussed in Chapter II. Whereas, traditional media sources facilitate information sharing in a 
top-down fashion – that is, from a news conglomerate to individuals— STOMP encourages 
information sharing on a horizontal basis. Citizens hold the power to share and create stories by 
taking photos or sending written information to STOMP. This information is then posted to the 
site after being reviewed and edited by STOMP writers. In this sense, the site embodies a form of 
information sharing that exists between individuals, rather than between a singular news agency 
and the masses.  
However, STOMP’s parent company, Singapore Press Holdings, has known ties to the 
PAP in which the editorial board of each of its subsidiaries tailors content to favor the regime 
(“Global Intelligence Files” 2010). With STOMP, this strategy centers on the use of moderators 
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to review and edit stories submitted by users. Thus, while the information is generated by 
Singaporean citizens, the ability to control and regulate information is still in the hands of actors 
favorable to the regime. Still, the idea that citizens control the information flow creates a new 
dynamic for media consumption that is impossible with the top-down information hierarchy 
(Timms & Heimans 2018). When information is perceived to be coming from everyday people, 
it is far more relatable, it feels as though it is coming from one’s peers and thus accurately 
reflects the interest of the masses rather than an elite minority (Gross 2019). However, with 
STOMP the use of moderators to regulate news stories creates a filter that allows Singapore 
Press Holdings to continue to control the flow of information as they do with more conventional 
media sources. At the same time, this creates the perception of unregulated information sharing. 
As I explore in this chapter, this allows the regime to artificially create instances of popular 
engagement online that work to advance regime policies. 
In order to understand the PAP’s ability to advance public policy in this way, however, it 
is necessary to define artificial in terms of popular engagement. As I explore below, netizen 
participation on STOMP is still voluntary and, in my research, does not appear to follow any 
direct government coercion. That is to say, netizens participate on their own accord. However, 
the atmosphere in which netizens are encouraged to participate exists in a context where dissent 
is omitted. In controlling the flow of information online, the PAP is able to create a platform that 
appears to hold a multiplicity of ideas, when in reality it only allows for popular support. In this 
sense, the instances of popular engagement online are defined as artificial in that they do not 
emerge naturally from a free range of ideas. Throughout this chapter, I explore the PAP’s 




The following section of this chapter aims to contextualize the Speak Good English 
Movement, and STOMP within the Singaporean political sphere.  Section III then builds off of 
this context to illustrate the ways in which the PAP utilizes STOMP through English as it is 
Broken to garner support for the Speak Good English Movement. In exploring this further, I 
select two posts out of hundreds analyzed to illustrate the way that the PAP restructures SGEM 
around participation through English as it is Broken. These posts, explored in Section III aim to 
provide brief contextualization of the ways in which netizen’s participate in English as it is 
Broken. Finally, I close this chapter by summarizing my findings and outlining the basis for 
subsequent chapters. 
II. Context 
In coming to understand the PAP’s use of the Internet to advance its own authoritarian 
public policy, it is first necessary to understand two interconnected forces working together to 
give strength to the Singaporean regime. In this section, I connect the authoritarian People’s 
Action Party (PAP) to STOMP and the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM). Following this, 
I demonstrate how both of these components come together to allow the PAP to use the Internet 
to advance its own authoritarian public policy.  
 
The Straits Times Online Mobile Print (STOMP) 
The Straits Times Online Mobile Print (STOMP) was founded in June of 2006 (Tai Ann 
& Soh 2010; “Media Releases” 2007). STOMP embodies the peer-to-peer nature of information 
sharing by allowing netizens to post articles to the site. In collectively sharing news on the site, 
Singaporeans are given the opportunity to be active members of their society by engaging with, 
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and sharing news they themselves deem to be important. In this way, STOMP stands out from 
traditional news media because of its use of individual voices to generate news. Indeed, the site’s 
tagline reads “Activating Singapore’s most awesome citizen journalists [emphasis added]” 
(“Straits Times Online Mobile Print” 2020). The ability for Singaporeans to share information 
between each other on STOMP would seem to embody the participatory nature of the Internet 
that has made it so powerful in the 21st century (Heimans & Timms 2018). However, this 
information is reviewed and moderated by authors employed by STOMP’s parent company, 
Singapore Press Holdings (Tai Ann & Soh 2010; “Straits Times Online Mobile Print” 2020). As 
previously discussed, the media conglomerate often puts forth information favorable to the 
government throughout its many news sources, suggesting that STOMP may not be as 
democratic as it first appears (“Global Intelligence Files” 2010).  
The pro-government editorial policy of Singapore Press Holdings brings into question 
whether STOMP truly reflects the ideology of Singaporeans, or the People’s Action Party. While 
the site encourages citizens to submit content quickly and easily from their phones, the 
information is curated by STOMP editors (Dearman & Greenfield 2014). These individuals 
decide what is posted, when it is posted, and what information is included within the article. 
Thus, while on the surface level the site may appear to facilitate user generated stories, the 
information presented is first filtered by those loyal to the People’s Action Party. In this way, 
information sharing appears to have shifted from a centralized base towards Singaporean 
citizens. However, as is explored in the next section, even with this decentralization of 
information sharing, the Singaporean regime is still able to use the site as a tool for advancing a 
singlular narrative and subsequently advance public policy initiatives. The key difference 
however, is that the end policy seems to have been reached democratically. In effect, this creates 
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a system wherein public policy appears to reflect the will of Singaporeans. The reality, however, 
is just the opposite. 
One reason that STOMP is so useful to the PAP in advancing authoritarian policy 
through democratic practices is due to its simplicity. STOMP’s ease of use leads to a relatively 
low amount of effort required to engage with the site. In 2007, after existing for just one year, 
STOMP had over 70 million page views and was listed as Singapore’s number one social 
networking site (“Media Releases” 2007). Furthermore, Singapore Press Holdings praised the 
site for its ability to enact change through citizen journalism (“Media Releases” 2007). Since its 
creation, STOMP has been incredibly successful at both encouraging netizen participation, as 
well as facilitating an atmosphere that feels as though one’s involvement is enacting change. The 
ability to cultivate this participation holds incredible power in the hyper-connected world 
(Heimans & Timms 2018). As this chapter will explore, when utilized by the authoritarian PAP, 
the democratic nature of STOMP can be used to reinforce authoritarian power. 
When viewed in this context, the power of STOMP as a tool for the People’s Action 
Party to influence public policy becomes clear. The ability to channel collective action provides 
the government with an effective way to spread information that is consistent with the shifting 
modes of communication in the 21st century. This in turn allows the government to encourage its 
own agenda and use STOMP as a tool for garnering support surrounding new policy.  
 
The Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) 
In April of 2000, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong launched a government program to 
encourage Singaporeans to speak a more ubiquitous dialect of English known as Standard 
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English. The public policy program, known as the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM), has 
utilized different methods from organizing seminars, to giving speaking awards, to engaging in 
partnerships with other organizations, in an effort to encourage Singaporeans to adopt Standard 
English (“Speak Good English” 2004). These attempts to promote a uniform version of English 
are indicative of the multicultural policy programs that the PAP has put in place throughout its 
reign. The program was created in response to Tong’s belief that Singlish was “English 
corrupted by Singaporeans” (Tan 2016). The government believed that in order to fully 
assimilate with western, developed nations, a mastery of Standard English was necessary (Lim et 
al. 2010). In this way, the speaking of good English was linked to the future prosperity of the 
nation. As such, the Speak Good English Movement (SGEM) was created to encourage grammar 
structure and vocabulary more consistent with Standard English than Singaporean English (Wee 
2014).  
However, it is important to recognize that SGEM is explicitly a policy program that 
advances the authoritarian nature of the regime. As a starting point, the program was created by 
an authoritarian government, on this basis alone it can be viewed as an example of a policy 
program put forth by centralized power structures. However, on a much deeper level, SGEM 
embodies the PAP’s attempts to control the cultural sphere throughout Singapore. Since the 
independence of Singapore in 1965, the government has taken a stance of forced 
multiculturalism in an attempt to ensure that the incredibly diverse ethnic groups in Singapore 
are capable of living harmoniously. As Huat argues, the speaking of English is used as a tool by 
the PAP to distance itself from any racial group as a result of it not being tied to any ethnic 
constituency (2003). In this sense, English is seen as a key marker of promoting harmony 
throughout the country (Huat 2003). However, the reality is that this harmony is often superficial 
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and instead is used as justification for unilateral policy decisions made by the government (Huat 
2003). In this sense, SGEM can be seen as an example of authoritarian public policy by the PAP 
as it both emerges from unilateral decision making, as well as contributes to a system that allows 
for increased control by the PAP. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that SGEM differs from other literacy and language 
campaigns in that it not only advocates for speaking Standard English, but also, from its 
inception, encouraged the renunciation of Singlish (Bruthiaux 2010; “Speak Good Singlish” 
2009). In this regard, SGEM is indicative of the PAP’s attempts to enforce a hegemonic culture 
through public policy. SGEM attempted to alter the cultural framework of Singaporean society 
by removing an aspect of Singaporean culture that made it unique (Bruthiaux 2010; Wee 2009). 
When viewed through this lens, the Speak Good English Movement reflects the authoritarian 
nature of the PAP’s attempts to control the cultural sphere of Singaporean society.  
When the Speak Good English Movement was first launched in the year 2000, its 
approach to engaging the public fully embodied a top-down approach to disseminating 
information and policy advancement. The movement was led by a committee of individuals, 
interested in reducing the use of Singlish among Singaporeans under 40 (Nirmala 2000a). In its 
first year, the movement utilized the power of the Singapore Teachers’ Union to create a seminar 
at the Shangri-La Hotel. This seminar, attended by roughly 500 people, most of them teachers, 
worked to emphasize the teaching of Standard English in Singaporean schools (Nirmala 2000b). 
The idea was that teachers would begin to implement what they learned at the conference to 
students throughout the city-state. At this time, the movement embodied the nature of traditional 
power structures before the technological revolution (Heimans & Timms 2018). The government 
first worked to encourage the speaking of good English among a select group of individuals. 
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Those individuals would then spread this information to the larger mass of Singaporeans. The 
trickle down nature of reworking the English language in Singapore made the hierarchy of power 
abundantly clear. In the first year, the People’s Action Party put forth an ideology that was then 
distributed to the masses in a top-down fashion. When viewed through this lens, it becomes clear 
why the movement was often criticized as an overreach of the PAP’s power (Bruthiaux 2010). 
Using these methods, the PAP’s advancement of public policy appears forceful. While the 
teachers attended the conference willingly, the concepts that they learned were implemented in 
their own curriculums, creating an education system that excluded Singlish. However, as I 
explore, the PAP dramatically altered the approach to encouraging Singaporeans to speak good 
English by accounting for more peer-to-peer methods for sharing information. 
Since its inception, SGEM has drawn mixed responses from the Singaporean public. 
Many argue that SGEM aims to improve the image of Singaporeans in the western world rather 
than to actually learn the proper speaking of English; that the movement failed to account for the 
actual spoken practice of English, particularly in multilingual societies; and that the project was 
indicative of governmental overreach that has so often characterized the PAP (Bruthiaux 2010). 
Furthermore, Singaporean English is viewed as a marker of Singaporean identity. From this, 
responses to the movement such as the Save Our Singlish Campaign and the Speak Good 
Singlish Movement have arisen, arguing that Singlish is a uniting factor that both connects the 
multicultural nation and makes it unique (Wee 2014). However, others supported the SGEM, 
arguing that the speaking of proper English was crucial to ensuring Singapore’s position as a 
developed nation in the global sphere (Lim et al. 2010). The conflicting ideologies surrounding 
SGEM during this time period illustrate a friction between governments and citizens in which 
opposition movements spearheaded by individuals were put in direct contrast with the 
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authoritarian PAP. As is explored in the next section, the PAP was able to alter this dynamic 
through the creation of an online forum on STOMP. In doing so, increased participation in 
SGEM emerged, making popular support for the policy more clear. In this way, the authoritarian 
government used a supposedly democratic tool to advance its public policy. 
III. Influencing Public Policy: English as it is Broken 
This section explores the PAP’s use of STOMP as a tool to implement authoritarian 
public policy, namely SGEM, through the English as it is Broken column. The English as it is 
Broken column was introduced in print in 2006 as part of the Speak Good English Movement. 
Two years later it was launched as a regular feature on STOMP. The column allowed 
Singaporeans to engage with the movement by submitting questions concerning proper English 
to STOMP, and then having their questions posted online with responses (Pakiam 2008 Tai Ann 
& Soh 2010). The online version of English as it is Broken became an instant success. The 
column used the participatory nature of the Internet to facilitate engagement for traditional power 
structures within an authoritarian regime. That is to say, the PAP used tactics typically associated 
with democracy, namely increased participation, to advance values put forth by the autocratic 
power. As discussed above, the Speak Good English Movement reflects the PAP’s aim to exert 
control over the cultural sphere. The Singaporean government used STOMP’s English as it is 
Broken column to advance this policy in two ways: (1) by using the column to restructure the 
movement to better engage Singaporean citizens, and (2) by shaping the nature of how 





Participatory Power to Advance the PAP 
As previously stated, the power of English as it is Broken rested in its ability to 
encourage participation surrounding the Speak Good English Movement. Thus, in a seemingly 
contradictory way, the PAP was able to utilize practices associated with democracy to reinforce 
autocratic public policy. The PAP understands that today’s leaders, even under authoritarian 
regimes, must succeed in a world with both institutional and collective power (Heimans & 
Timms 2018). That is to say, the hyper-connected nature of the Internet holds the potential to 
challenge dominant and hegemonic power structures. In order to account for this changing power 
dynamic, the People’s Action Party has worked to increase participation surrounding 
authoritarian policy.  
In accordance with this line of thinking, the PAP transformed SGEM from a movement 
defined by traditional power structures and distributed to Singaporeans, to one that actively 
encouraged participation from all through English as it is Broken. In doing so, the PAP worked 
to push power away from itself and toward Singaporean citizens. English as it is Broken allowed 
netizens to write to English speaking experts with any questions related to proper English that 
would then be shared on the column with responses from a team of experts, three times a week 
(Pakiam 2008). Concerning the public’s engagement with the government program, the Deputy 
Editor for the Straits Times, Felix Soh wrote:  
“… members of the public generate all the English language posers [sic]. Daily, 
we receive query after query on English language usage since we introduced the 
feature in July 2006. We could not shut off the tap, even if we had contemplated 
doing so. The queries just kept flowing in non-stop.” (Tai Ann & Soh 2010 pg. 1). 
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As Soh illustrates, Singaporeans felt an incredibly strong desire to participate in the movement. 
As the column transferred to STOMP, the amount of effort required to participate dropped even 
further as those interested in accessing the column could do so online, and those interested in 
submitting entries could do so via the site, SMS, and WhatsApp (“Straits Times Online Mobile 
Print” 2020). As an increasing number of Singaporeans could participate in the movement, and 
as action became less centralized and more collective, the power hierarchy apparent within the 
PAP’s public policy program became less obvious. 
 However, the fact that the forum (and STOMP more generally) was regulated by 
moderators favoring the PAP, suggests that the site did not truly embody the open nature of 
information sharing that it appeared to. Rather, only posts that supported the speaking of 
Standard English over Singlish, and thus advanced SGEM, were accepted. In all posts analyzed 
for this site, none of them appear to be critical of SGEM. However, as is reflected in the Speak 
Good Singlish Movement and the Save our Singlish Campaign, opposition to the movement did 
exist. This suggests that the PAP aimed to increase participation with SGEM solely with respect 
to those who supported the movement. Rather than create a forum that encouraged a variety of 
opinions, the PAP aimed to increase participation from only one side. 
 The netizen engagement in English as it is Broken is somewhat surprising considering the 
frequent criticism SGEM drew with respect to its attempts to erase Singlish in favor of Standard 
English (Bruthiaux 2010; Rose & Galloway 2017). However, English as it is Broken allowed 
netizens to participate in new and exciting ways. This had the effect of drawing out a larger 
number of users seemingly in support of the movement. With the introduction of the online 
forum, the friction surrounding SGEM was no longer between citizens and government, but 
between the citizens themselves. The result was a system wherein those both in support and 
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dissent of SGEM engaged in democratic practices. However, one side was created by an 
authoritarian power, controlled by an authoritarian power through moderators, and worked to 
reinforce authoritarian public policy. 
A central goal of the PAP when attempting to enact authoritarian policy such as SGEM is 
to engage as many individuals with the movement as possible. As exemplified by Soh’s quote 
above, the ability to increase participation and engagement is directly associated with support for 
the movement. However, increasing the number of individuals participating was not the only 
action the PAP took to advance its public policy with respect to SGEM. In addition, the regime 
also worked to remold the ways in which Singaporeans participated. 
 
Reshaping Participation 
In addition to increasing the number of individuals participating in the Speak Good 
English Movement, the creation of English as it is Broken allowed the People’s Action Party to 
fundamentally change the ways in which Singaporeans were able to participate. At its inception, 
the movement was only open to those with a deep commitment to the English language. To 
return to one of the first events held by the Singapore Teachers’ Union, the 500 participants were 
almost entirely academics with a deep interest in speaking and understanding the language 
(Nirmala 2000b). However, English as it is Broken was created with the specific purpose of not 
only increasing participation, but also providing “a non-academic way for [Singaporeans] to 
learn how to use and speak English correctly” (Tai Ann & Soh 2010 pg. 1). This method for 
encouraging engagement was based on the idea that certain institutions – be they political, 
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academic or otherwise – are inherently inaccessible to certain individuals due to financial, time 
or familial obligations.  
With this shift from academic participation towards a more effortless and engaging 
platform to learn English, the Speak Good English Movement was open to a far wider support 
base. Individuals did not need a PhD in the subject to have a voice in SGEM. Instead, with the 
advent of the STOMP forum, all that was required was a phone or computer and a desire to 
engage. In this sense, English as it is Broken allowed individuals to participate in their own way. 
In working to reshape the ways in which individuals could participate in SGEM, the PAP 
allowed netizens to define the movement for themselves. Those without an academic background 
could engage in fun and lighthearted ways, whereas those interested in exploring English from 
an intellectual perspective could engage in more inquisitive ways. However, while netizens could 
choose the ways in which they participate, those that did participate were still being educated in 
modes of acceptable language use (Dearman & Greenfield 2014). The result was a system that 
capitalized on netizen participation to reinforce authoritarian public policy initiatives. 
To elaborate, one reason for the column’s triumph was attributed to its convenient, 
engaging and interactive nature with a humorous twist (Pakiam 2008). As exemplified in Figure 
3.1 this jovial approach gave the column a feel that appeared less like the product of a 
government program and more like a Facebook news feed – that is, it held just the right balance 
of actual information and lighthearted fun (Pakiam 2008; Tai Ann & Soh 2010). Figure 3.1 
displays an image taken in a shop reading “Buy One Free One” to illustrate a buy one get one 
free deal. The satirical title “Buy this milk and set it free!” reflects a rhetoric that attempts to 
poke fun at the improper use of English in public. As such, it can easily be dismissed as 
unimportant and insignificant. However, at the same time it establishes a framework for 
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governing the modes of acceptable language use in Singapore. The forum allowed for citizens to 
participate in non-academic and lighthearted ways. Yet the modes of participation still worked to 
enforce a hegemonic way of speaking English. As such, few would assert that this post illustrates 
the PAP’s influence in altering the use of language in Singapore. Rather, the site defers the 
regulation of the English language to netizens, allowing individuals to hold each other 
accountable through non-threatening posts on English as it is Broken. Thus, the forum’s ability 
to govern language use had the effect of advancing SGEM in a peer-to-peer fashion. Calls to 
“speak good English” no longer came from the regime, but rather from Singaporean netizens, 
eager to participate in the movement. 
 
Figure 3.1: A comical post from the English as it is Broken Column (Tai Ann & Soh 2010) 
As explored above, the creation of the online column allowed users to create and engage 
with an authoritarian policy program in ways that felt non-academic and lighthearted (Pakiam 
2008; Tai Ann & Soh 2010). In addition, Singaporeans also had the opportunity to participate in 
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more serious ways. As Figure 3.2 shows, for example, some posts appear to have a more formal 
tone. Unlike Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 contains no jokes, it is clearly divided into four sections, 
each with explicit questions that stem from the use of English in the work place. In this post, it 
appears more as though netizens are being coached on how to speak within the work place. This 
alternative mode of participation in English as it is Broken uses the site to engage in more 
serious inquiries. This post follows an instructional tone, intended to inform the viewer. With 
this, the reader is presented with the opportunity to improve the way that they speak at work. 
With respect to this specific post, the underlying assumption is that there is, in fact, a correct way 
to speak at work. As such, by posting these questions, the PAP’s attempts to encourage Standard 
English in public (including work environments) is reinforced. 
 
Figure 3.2: An example of one of the more serious column queries 
 In either instance, however, netizens were able to decide how to participate on their own 
terms. English as it is Broken could simultaneously embody the spirit of social media and other 
meme sites as well as more informative sites for serious queries. The multifaceted nature of 
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English as it is Broken was facilitated through the ability to participate openly and on one’s own 
terms. Furthermore, while the information was moderated by the STOMP team, English as it is 
Broken appeared to create a site where individuals could share information with each other, the 
information was taught to them by everyday citizens rather than by authority figures. This had 
the effect of feeling less forced and more personal (Heimans & Timms 2018). Additionally, the 
collection of individuals working together to advance SGEM in their own ways created a system 
that appeared to embody democratic practices. However the implications of this engagement had 
the alternative effect of reinforcing authoritarian public policy. Thus, through English as it is 
Broken, Singaporeans could participate in advancing authoritarian public policy on their own 
accord. As a result of the forum, there was no longer a need to encourage a singular way of 
learning Standard English. Instead, Singaporeans could learn the language on their own terms, 
allowing them to feel the same in that they were a part of a community, but different in that each 
poster was provided with a new degree of agency (Heimans & Timms 2018). Thus, a new 
dynamic between citizens and government was created that provided incredible support to 
centralized powers (Lecheler et al. 2010). In this sense, increased participation did not 
necessarily give way to more democracy. Public engagement in English as it is Broken 
definitively reinforced the authoritarian government’s public policy.  
 Beyond this, in advancing SGEM, the regime is able to reinforce its legitimacy as a 
political power capable of ensuring the nation’s prosperity (Bruthiaux 2010; Tan 2014). As 
previously stated, SGEM’s stated purpose was to assimilate Singapore with western, developed 
nations, by adopting Standard English (Lim et al. 2010). In this way, the policy program can be 
seen as a way of working to ensure the success of Singapore as a developed nation. Furthermore, 
as Tan (2014) argues, the PAP’s legitimacy rests on the belief that the regime will provide 
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prosperity for its citizens. Thus, in advancing the Speak Good English Movement, the PAP 
works to reinforce its authoritarian power. However, because the attempt to encourage a 
hegemonic version of English was met with criticism in Singapore, the regime developed new 
methods for soliciting participation online in order to illustrate popular support for the 
movement. This had the effect of engaging netizens in the movement in new ways that did not 
feel forced, yet still advanced the regime’s policy initiative.  
In order to fully understand how the above methods for increasing and reshaping 
participation can work in the governments favor, it is also necessary to understand the conditions 
that were necessary for English as it is Broken to reinforce authoritarian public policy. While the 
forum takes a decentralized approach to sharing information, the posts are monitored by a team 
of editors who ensure the information put forth is in support of the regime. Thus, no anti-PAP 
rhetoric will ever be seen on English as it is Broken. This allows the PAP to channel the 
participatory power of netizens to engage with public policy in a way that is specific to pro-
regime support. Thus, the site appears to be a free market of ideas, when in reality it only puts 
forth information favorable to the regime. This distinction between STOMP and other, less 
regulated, information sharing sites is incredibly important for the PAP in attempting to reinforce 
its public policy. The Internet is simply a tool that can lead to outcomes favorable to democracy 
or autocracy. As such, under certain conditions, in this case the use of moderators, the PAP is 
able to effectively utilize the Internet to advance an authoritarian policy agenda.  
Thus, through both increasing and reshaping participation with SGEM through English as 
it is Broken, the PAP was able to channel the power of collective participation online to reinforce 
its policy agenda. When taken at face value, the ability of sites that encourage collective 
engagements to reinforce authoritarian power appears paradoxical. However, the case study of 
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English as it is Broken exemplifies that centralized powers hold the ability to channel netizen 
engagement to reinforce authoritarian public policy. 
IV. Conclusion 
 The above methods employed by the PAP to advance the Speak Good English Movement 
shed light on the government’s use of collective action to advance public policy. In the 21st 
century, with both collective and institutional power holding strong sway in modern governance, 
it is crucial that autocratic powers like the PAP utilize new methods to influence public policy. 
With the hyper-connected and participatory nature of the Internet, sites like STOMP have 
become an avenue to achieve this. By creating a platform for a wide number of individuals to 
actively engage with a government program, the PAP saw a massive increase in its support base 
for SGEM. This support base was so great that at its height, English as it is Broken produced two 
bestselling books (Tai Ann & Soh 2010).  
Furthermore, The Speak Good English Movement is reflective of the PAP’s authoritarian 
reach into the cultural sphere (Bruthiaux 2010). As dissent began to grow, a dangerous power 
dynamic emerged between the regime and Singaporean citizens that placed the masses in direct 
opposition to the government. However, columns such as English as it is Broken hold the ability 
to engage supporters of the regime’s program in easy and accessible ways. This allows the PAP 
to appear to defer the power of the movement towards netizens, shifting the focus away from the 
centralized authoritarian regime and more in the direction of the people. However, it is important 
to recognize that this support base was artificially created. That is, support existed in isolation of 
alternative opinions. The use of moderators to regulate information on STOMP creates a system 
in which netizen engagement is only supported when it exists in favor of the regime. 
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Here, the power of artificially creating instances of public support cannot be understated. 
With English as it is Broken, netizens had a say in SGEM, they could determine the direction for 
themselves. Rather than being told exactly what the policy initiative was by a higher authority, 
they were able to choose its direction by engaging with it in their own way. At the same time, 
however, the PAP was able to ensure the content produced was favorable to the regime through 
the use of moderators. In this way, the government is able to simultaneously encourage public 
support and discourage dissent; all without directly influencing or coercing its citizens. 
This ability to increase participation in an authoritarian program reflects the aim of many 
regimes to mobilize the masses. While many argue that authoritarianism works to silence 
collective voices, the hyper-connectivity of the Internet suggests that in the globalized world, 
immobilization is increasingly difficult to achieve (Colton & Hale 2009). This reality is 
particularly true for regimes such as Singapore’s. As discussed in Chapter II, regimes that hide 
behind a façade of democracy are presented with the opportunity to either engage the masses or 
to drop the mask and fully embrace their authoritarian systems. As Singapore has chosen the 
former, the ability to maintain power becomes increasingly difficult and uncharted. However, by 
encouraging public participation on the Internet in strategic ways, the PAP has continuously 
increased the number of individuals that engage with autocratic public policy. As is explored in 
the following chapters, STOMP is not the only avenue that the PAP uses to advance its policy 
agenda. The following chapter explores the use of the sites The Straits Times and Change.org to 





Chapter IV- Capitalizing on Pre-existing User Engagement 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explored the relationship between STOMP (Straits Times 
Online Mobile Print) and the People’s Action Party (PAP) to show how STOMP was used as a 
tool for the PAP to advance its public policy agenda by artificially creating avenues to express 
popular support. In this chapter, I shift my focus towards the way the regime accounts for 
increased participation on sites over which it does not have control. In this sense, I seek to 
answer my thesis question of why the PAP is able to continue to implement authoritarian public 
policy despite Internet technologies allowing for democratic practices by addressing the growing 
degree of online activity outside of the regime’s control. In this chapter, I argue that the PAP is 
able to do this by utilizing two Internet tools. The first, known as Change.org, is founded on 
netizen (or Internet user) participation and cannot be regulated by the regime. The second, 
known as The Straits Times, is a conventional media source that has long been considered a 
mouth piece for the PAP (“Global Intelligence Files” 2010). As I demonstrate, both of these 
tools work in lockstep to advance regime public policy wherein Change.org generates public 
engagement with the regimes policy agenda, and The Straits Times ensures that only support can 
be viewed by the broader public.  
 I explore how an online petition, created and supported by Singaporeans, provided the 
regime with a mechanism to illustrate popular support and subsequently advance its public 
policy agenda. This petition, created on Change.org, called for the Swedish heavy metal band, 
Watain, to be banned from Singapore. The PAP eventually did ban Watain, causing many other 
petitions to emerge criticizing the decision. Singapore’s relatively free Internet allows for a 
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multiplicity of ideas to be put forth online (“Freedom of the Net” 2019), making the emergence 
of dissenting petitions an inevitability. Because the government of Singapore cannot prevent 
dissenting opinions from growing on Change.org, it must adopt new methods for ensuring that 
the strongest voices are those that favor the government. Thus, in this chapter I explore the 
PAP’s attempts to create an image surrounding its policy decisions that only highlights support, 
and ignores criticism. As is explored through the Watain case study, the ability for the regime to 
do this is strengthened through online tools.  
As I demonstrate, the PAP uses The Straits Times, the pro-government and most popular 
media outlet (“Global Intelligence Files” 2010; Kaur et. al 2016), to selectively highlight 
Change.org petitions that demonstrate support for the regime’s public policy, and at the same 
time ignore those that express dissent. In selectively choosing which petitions to cover, the PAP 
is able to use Change.org, a tool that appears to be founded on democratic principles, to advance 
an authoritarian ideology. To understand this further, I use text scanning tools, specifically, the 
Google Custom Search REST API, to gather Straits Times’ articles that discuss Change.org 
petitions. The findings, discussed in Section III of this chapter, work to illustrate how the PAP 
uses both traditional media outlets like The Straits Times and sites that facilitate netizen 
engagement like Change.org to advance its policy agenda. 
 In the following section, I discuss the traditional news source The Straits Times and its 
close relationship with the PAP. Additionally, I introduce and contextualize the online petition 
site Change.org within Singapore. In Section III, I analyze how both of these sites were utilized 
to advance the PAP’s public policy through the banning of the Swedish heavy metal band, 
Watain, in March of 2019. Finally, in Section IV, I summarize my findings and discuss the 




In this section, I provide background and contextualization for the ways the PAP is able 
to advance its public policy using both traditional and non-traditional information sharing sites.  
The first site, The Straits Times, is the dominant Singaporean news source in the country. In my 
research, the site works to draw attention to Change.org petitions that show support for the 
PAP’s public policy, while ignoring those that do not. The second site, Change.org is an online 
petition tool where netizens are encouraged to add their names to a list of signatures surrounding 
causes they support. I find that Change.org allows netizens to show support and dissent for 
authoritarian public policy. In exploring both sites, I illustrate how the PAP utilizes netizen 
participation on Change.org through online petitions to demonstrate support for its policy 
programs on The Straits Times.  In essence, the PAP points to favorable petitions on Change.org 
in The Straits Times to indicate public support, while at the same time ignoring unfavorable 
petitions. 
 
The Straits Times 
The Singaporean media company known as The Straits Times was founded in 1845 when 
Singapore was under British rule. The media company is a subsidiary of Singapore Press 
Holdings, which also owns STOMP—the site discussed in Chapter III (“The Straits Times” 
2010). The company can best be understood as a news agency in the most traditional sense. The 
Straits Times utilizes professional journalists, editors and publishers to create its content 
(Dearman & Greenfield 2014; “The Straits Times” 2010). In this sense, the news agency takes a 
top-down approach to disseminating information to the population through both print and online 
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media. The Straits Times’ is also perceived to be a fairly credible source of media in the country 
(Jiuan 2002). Thus, those looking for more serious news would be drawn to The Straits Times for 
its consistent coverage of current events in the economic, political and cultural world. This 
credibility allows The Straits Times to publish news that carries a heavier weight than other 
information sharing sources such as Facebook and Twitter, which have become breeding 
grounds for misinformation (Gertz 2019).  
The Straits Times is also the most popular news source in Singapore (Kaur et. al 2016). 
While other news sites such as Channel News Asia, and Asia One are popular in Singapore, they 
are not specific to the nation, nor do they garner the same degree of popularity as The Straits 
Times (Kaur et. al 2016). That is not to say, however, that the attention The Straits Times draws 
is necessarily deserved (“Global Intelligence Files” 2010; Kaur et. al 2016; Mydans 2011). The 
site has known ties to the PAP dating back to before the nation gained independence (“Global 
Intelligence Files” 2010; Mydans 2011). The media company has also largely been criticized for 
being a mouthpiece of the PAP (“Associated Press” 2017). While The Straits Times is privatized 
and thus not under the direct control of the government, the PAP has employed a series of legal 
controls that can be utilized to ensure journalists and editors put forth content favorable to the 
regime (Lee 2010). A prominent example of this, The Societies Act of 1967, states that an 
organization of more than 10 people must be registered (Lee 2010). This Act forces The Straits 
Times to self-regulate for fear of having its corporate license revoked by the government. This is 
just one instance of a series of regulations the PAP implements to control media content (Lee 
2010). The result is a media atmosphere in which editors effectively tailor content to support the 
regime. As I explore below, the bias apparent in The Straits Times leads to system wherein 
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collective support for the regime is highlighted, and dissent is omitted. This allows the PAP to 
advance its own public policy by continuing to control the traditional media. 
Media control in Singapore has largely shifted in the late 20th and early 21st century. In 
the 1980s, the government began merging and closing various newspaper companies, to create 
fewer mainstream print media sources (Lee 2010). The government also created Singapore Press 
Holdings, which monopolized print media in the nation (Lee 2010). This led to the reduction of 
alternative voices in domestic news on Singapore that only continued as the print companies 
transitioned into the digital sphere (Lee 2010; “Living History” 2015). This has caused scholars 
(George 2002 pg. 175) to describe the Singaporean media atmosphere as centered on “the 
government’s freedom from the press” over the press’s freedom from the government (Lee 
2010). Thus, in the case of The Straits Times, the site is perceived to be voice for the PAP 
(Mydans 2011), wherein the company is expected to put forth a narrative consistent with the 
party (Lee 2010). Thus, for the purpose of this research, I consider The Straits Times to be an 
extension of the PAP that the party has used to advance its policy agenda for decades. What I 
explore using the case study below, is how a site such as Change.org can be utilized in 
conjunction with The Straits Times to develop a new method for policy advancement founded on 
collective support. 
As I explore in this chapter, the government has shifted its approach with The Straits 
Times to selectively incorporate sources and debates generated in other spheres of the Internet. In 
the past, pro-government media often ignored popular opinion in favor of presenting a narrative 
favorable to the PAP (Lee 2010). Now, the PAP turns to sites that facilitate increased connection 
among netizens to show popular support for its public policy. Change.org is one site that allows 
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Change.org is a for-profit, global petition website based in Silicon Valley with over 200 
million users (“NonProfit Times” 2017). While the site praises itself for being a champion of 
democratic practices online, the truth behind this claim is not so absolute. While the site does 
lead to increased civic engagement, many have criticized it as a tool that does little to enact 
tangible policy change. The ability to translate the civic engagement seen on Change.org to the 
analog world, wherein it can influence all levels of government, is weak (Mele 2016). The site’s 
emphasis that anyone can create a petition capitalizes on the belief that in the hyper-connected 
world, anyone can be a change maker (Heimans & Timms 2018). Change.org argues that the 
connections it facilitates extend across nations and cultures. In so doing, it claims to unite the 
world around important causes (“Change.org” 2020). This rhetoric, taken from the Change.org 
website, implies that the increased connection of individuals, facilitated through the site 
necessarily leads to outcomes favorable to democracy. However, this chapter demonstrates that 
the PAP is able to use Change.org to advance its authoritarian policy goals. This outcome is 
paradoxical to the expectations of scholars (Minocher 2019) and Change.org’s own vision.  
To elaborate, Change.org— based in San Francisco, California—is largely outside of the 
direct sphere of the PAP’s influence. Change.org does not have ties to the regime. Furthermore, 
the nature of the site does not allow its content to be naturally tailored to benefit any singular 
entity. The site is not a news platform like The Straits Times, nor is it a social media site like 
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Facebook or Twitter. Rather, Change.org simply allows netizens to quickly and easily create 
petitions on topics important to them, free of charge. Individuals can then show their support for 
the petitions by adding their names. As a petition gains more signatures, a counter tracks the 
number of signees, showing an increase in collective support for the petition’s topic 
(“Change.org” 2020). In the Singaporean political sphere, this reality means that petitions can 
often arise both in support of and opposition to the regime’s public policy. 
Thus, conceptually, Change.org can be viewed as an Internet tool working to promote 
democratic practices. In February of 2020, for example, a petition calling for a question on child 
poverty in the U.S. Democratic Presidential debate gained nearly 80,000 signatures. Due to the 
significant traction the petition gained, candidates could be seen discussing child poverty on the 
debate stage for the first time in 20 years (Glenn 2019). These instances exemplifies the power of 
netizen participation in leading to tangible political change. However, as I explore below, the 
power of Change.org in creating democratic outcomes is not so absolute.  
Despite the site’s democratic potential, Change.org has drawn criticism for its inability to 
prevent electronic “bots”— or fake users generated by computers — from creating accounts and 
signing petitions in order to show support for causes (Wray 2018). This suggests that anyone 
interested in drawing attention to an issue can manipulate the site to advance an agenda in a 
seemly democratic way, without popular support. While there are reports of this occurring in 
Singapore, the claims are difficult to prove and Change.org argues that their site protects against 
this, making fake signatures an impossibility (Eddino 2019). At the same time, privacy concerns 
should also be noted. The creator of a petition can see the signors’ names, but names cannot be 
viewed publicly unless the creator of a petition discloses them (“Change.org” 2020). This 
situation has potentially harmful implications when petitions are generated in opposition to 
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repressive government systems. However, there is no reported instance of the PAP engaging in 
retribution against those who have signed. Based on this information, I consider that all petitions 
generated on Change.org are legitimate, that they are signed by actual individuals interested in 
supporting the cause, and that these individuals do not fear government persecution for signing a 
petition. From here, I explore the ways in which the PAP uses legitimate examples of netizen 
engagement online to advance its policy goals.  
As I explore later, the PAP does not need to bolster support through the use of bots for 
online petitions in favor of its policies. Nor does it need to overtly censor petitions that oppose 
the party. Instead, the regime allows both sides to be debated openly by not interfering with 
Change.org itself. Because Change.org is not a popular site for sharing information in Singapore 
(or any country), these debates exist in the margins of the Internet. Thus, the PAP is able to draw 
attention to petitions that support its policy decisions and can easily ignore petitions that criticize 
or oppose its positions. It is important to note that the PAP is not required to acknowledge any of 
the petitions in any way. To understand exactly how the PAP is able to draw attention to a 
specific type of Change.org petition, I explore in detail the petitions that emerged around the 
banning of the Swedish heavy metal band, Watain, below. 
III. Highlighting Support for Public Policy Decisions: A Case Study on Watain 
In this section, I illustrate the way the PAP selectively uses Change.org petitions to 
support its policy decisions on The Straits Times. Specifically, I analyze the PAP’s banning of 
the Swedish heavy metal band, Watain, after a Change.org petition emerged calling for their 
performance license to be revoked. Through this example, I show how the PAP highlights 
netizen participation on Change.org to show support for its policy decisions while ignoring 
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critical or oppositional positions. In this way, the authoritarian government capitalizes on an 
Internet tool typically associated with democracy (Change.org) to advance an authoritarian 
policy agenda.   
On March 7, 2019, the Swedish heavy metal band, Watain, was scheduled to appear at 
the small venue EBX Live Space on Pereira road in Singapore (Lim 2019). After receiving all 
necessary permits and permissions to perform, just hours before the concert, the Media 
Development Authority (MDA)—the PAP’s main censorship body— revoked the band’s 
performance license (Lim 2019). This was not the first time that a band had been prevented from 
performing in Singapore. A number of bands including Led Zeppelin have been prohibited by 
the PAP from playing. Rather, what makes the banning of Watain unique is that the call for 
removal did not come from the government, but from a Christian group in Singapore who argued 
that the band’s lyrics were deeply offensive and denigrating to the Christian faith (Lim 2019). 
The MDA’s decision to revoke Watain’s performance license was promoted by a Change.org 
petition, started by a Singaporean named Rachel Chan, that advocated for the banning. The 
decision to ban Watain’s performance and its reasoning were covered widely on The Straits 
Times. 
Although the government portrayed the ban as a popular policy, the decision was 
criticized by many Singaporeans as an affront on free speech in the nation (Lim 2019). 
Immediately, four dissenting petitions emerged online calling for the band’s license to be 
reinstated. The fact that the banning was called for by netizens was a central aspect of The Straits 
Times’ coverage on the topic as it demonstrated popular support for the Watain cancellation. 
However, The Straits Times chose to ignore the dissenting opinions put forth by the public and 
only highlighted support for the banning. In this case, the PAP was able to create an image 
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surrounding its policy decisions that appeared to be founded on collective support, but in reality 
only presented one side of the issue. 
In this sense, the banning of Watain is an example of authoritarian public policy in that it 
exemplifies the PAP’s attempts to regulate culture deemed harmful to the social harmony of 
Singaporean society (Huat 2003). As discussed in Chapter III, the PAP has often drawn criticism 
for its authoritarian overreach into the cultural sphere (Bruthiaux 2010). This control is often 
justified on the basis that in order to live in a multi-ethnic society, some regulation of speech and 
ideology that could be harmful to other races, religions, and cultures is necessary (Huat 2003). 
This cultural regulation works to govern the behaviors and mindsets of Singaporean’s (Lee 
2010), and subsequently establishes the PAP as the powerful protector ensuring the continued 
prosperity of the city-state (Huat 2003). Thus, in engaging in the regulation of culture, the PAP 
works to further cement its political power within the city-state. 
The PAP’s overreach of power into the cultural sphere is embodied in the banning of 
Watain. In a statement concerning the banning, the Minister for Home Affairs, Law K. 
Shanmugam, justified the censorship on the basis that the band promotes religious hate speech 
that contradicts Singaporean values (Hadi 2019a). Citing the support of the Christian community, 
Shanmugam argued that the band’s lyrics were offensive to Christians. In this way, the banning 
of Watain was founded on the idea that Singapore must work to maintain harmony among 
cultures in order to ensure a prosperous society (Hadi 2019a; Huat 2003). Thus, the decision to 
ban Watain reinforced the PAP’s political legitimacy by arguing it preserved the prosperity of 
the nation (Wong & Huang 2010). As explored in previous chapters, the exchange relation 
between the PAP and Singaporean citizens rests on the idea that the party provides prosperity, 
and in return, receives legitimacy (Wong & Huang 2010). In this way, the decision to ban 
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Watain can be viewed as a public policy initiative that works reinforce the PAP’s political 
power. 
However, critics argue that the effect of the banning on Singapore’s free speech rules is 
far more harmful than the damage of letting the band perform (Lim 2019; Tan 2019). To 
elaborate, some netizens believed that the banning of Watain damaged the fundamental right for 
people to express themselves even if that expression was not universally well received (Lim 
2019). As I explore below, criticism of the banning did exist online. Yet by selectively 
highlighting support and ignoring dissent—specifically on Change.org—the government was 
able to effectively enforce its public policy. In order to better understand this concept, I outline 
the dissenting petitions that emerged on Change.org below. 
 
Counter Movements on Change.org 
 As previously stated, significant protests to the banning of Watain did exist online. Here, 
I analyze four such petitions and their contents to illustrate the arguments behind opposition to 
the banning. The four petitions I analyze gained the most traction in terms of number of 
signatures. While the dissenting petition with the most signatures (just under 6,000), is still well 
under the original petition in support of the banning (which gained over 15,000), the number of 
signees is not insignificant (Chan 2019; Lim 2019). Moreover, a total of 12,000 signatures were 
garnered across the four dissenting petitions. After analyzing these petitions, I illustrate how the 
PAP was able to effectively ignore them, while simultaneously highlighting the original petition 
that called for the banning.  
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On Change.org, the petition that called for the banning was quickly followed by four 
additional petitions that criticized the decision. The first two petitions were direct in their 
criticism of the government. They argued that the banning of Watain was a huge setback to free 
speech and democracy in Singapore. The first, titled “Get Rachel Chan deported from 
Singapore”, took aim at the woman who started the petition. This petition gained 2,300 
signatures and argued that Chan had spread fake news and misinformation (Tan 2019). In so 
doing, she had effectively discriminated against a group of people interested in the band’s music. 
The second petition, titled “Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs to reinstate and reschedule 
Watain show,” gained nearly 6,000 signatures and argued that the banning was a huge setback to 
free speech in Singapore. This petition, much more political in nature, directly criticized the 
government for prioritizing certain cultures and regulating speech in an authoritarian manner 
(Lim 2019; Tan 2019). Both of these petitions gained thousands of signatures in support. Yet 
neither of them drew significant attention on The Straits Times.  
The third petition, satirical in nature, was started by a Singaporean citizen who argued 
that Maroon 5 should also be banned for its harmful lyrics, such as “sugar, yes please”, that 
encourage young Singaporeans to consume more sugar in their diet—going against the 
government’s attempts to fight diabetes in Singapore (Lay 2019). This petition gained roughly 
2,000 signatures. The final petition called for the banning of the English soccer team Manchester 
United on the basis that it has a red devil as its official logo—a feature that could also be viewed 
as harmful to the Christian faith. This petition gained roughly 1,300 signatures. Both of these 
petitions attempted to make fun of the policy decision enacted by the regime. In so doing, they 
attempted to expose the hypocrisy of the government’s ban. The low number of signatures for 
each of these petitions relative to the number received for the petition that called for the banning, 
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could be used to justify exclusion from The Straits Times articles. However, the first two 
petitions did gain more traction. Furthermore, the criticisms of the banning, illustrated in these 
petitions, were also excluded from The Straits Times. In this way, the PAP controlled the 
narrative presented on The Straits Times and only allowed discussion of citizen support for the 
ban to appear. The fact that The Straits Times is the most popular news source in Singapore 
(Kaur et. al 2016) meant that the dominant narrative surrounding the ban failed to include 
popular dissent.  
As explored further below, the dissenting petitions were largely left out of popular 
discourse. This silence might be one possible reason for the difference in the number of 
signatures. Because the dissenting petitions did not receive as much attention from popular 
media, many netizens may not have been aware of their existence and thus unable to sign them. 
This idea is supported by the fact that number of signatures in support of the banning continued 
to grow as more Straits Times articles were published. Even still, the criticisms present in the 
Change.org petitions are valid and demonstratively important to Singaporeans. Thus their 
exclusion highlights the PAP’s attempts to ignore popular dissent for the regime’s public policy. 
 
Representation of Change.org Petitions on The Straits Times 
As previously stated, The Straits Times exemplifies traditional media sources wherein 
news is disseminated from a team of professional journalists, editors and publishers to the 
population. In this sense, it is not considered an open and public space wherein all voices can be 
recognized. Change.org, on the other hand, is largely viewed as a tool to facilitate democratic 
engagement on the Internet by engaging netizens in causes important to them (“Change.org” 
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2020). The PAP is able to use The Straits Times—the most popular news source in Singapore 
(Kaur et. al 2016)—to acknowledge Change.org petitions that support the regime’s public policy 
and ignore those that criticize the PAP’s decisions. 
To illustrate this point, I analyzed articles from The Straits Times written in the two 
weeks after the March 7th banning. During this time period, the banning of Watain dominated 
The Straits Times’ headlines. Using the The Google Custom Search REST API, a program 
designed to scan online articles for key words and return results during a specific time period, I 
searched for any articles on The Straits Times containing the word “Watain.” Because the band 
was at the center of press coverage, this was the only keyword used. This search returned fifteen 
articles over the two week period. In Figure 4.1, I organize these articles into four distinct 
categories: (1) those that solely mention the Change.org petition in support of the banning (8 
articles), (2) those that solely mention the Change.org petitions against the banning (0 articles), 
(3) those that mention both the Change.org petitions in support of the banning and those that are 
opposed (1 article), and (4) those that do not mention the Change.org petitions at all (6 articles). 
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The results illustrate the degree to which collective support in favor of the regime is 
prioritized in The Straits Times. From the articles returned by the search, the majority mentioned 
the support for banning Watain on Change.org, while only one article reports on any significant 
opposition to the banning. However, as previously stated, significant opposition did exist. 
Dissenting petitions had emerged and gained significant traction calling for the band’s 
performance license to be reinstated. All four of these dissenting petitions gained thousands of 
signatures just hours after they were posted. However, they were rarely mentioned in The Straits 
Times’ official coverage of the banning. The findings illustrate how the PAP works to use the 
Internet to highlight support for public policy while ignoring dissent. The PAP’s grasp on The 
Straits Times in the past has allowed the regime to create a favorable political narrative (“Global 
Intelligence Files” 2010; Mydans 2011). However, with the onset of increased political 
participation online, specifically through Change.org, the PAP can now point to instances of 
netizen support. In doing so, the government creates an image surrounding its policy decisions 
that appears to be founded on collective support, but in reality only presents the government’s 
side of the issue. 
 One article in The Straits Times, for example, titled “IMDA pulls plug on gig hours 
before Swedish band's show: Home Affairs Ministry raises concerns over Watain show that had 
been given R18 rating,” cites the Change.org petition. The article states: 
An online petition on Change.org, which has garnered 15,000 signatures, had called for a 
ban on concerts by Watain and Soilwork, another Swedish metal band. It said the bands 
"do not represent the culture which we want in our youth." Soilwork is slated to play at 
EBX Live Space on Oct 29 (Hadi 2019b). 
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In this case, the petition serves the definitive purpose of quantifying the degree of support for 
authoritarian public policy. In doing so, the government works to demonstrate that its policy 
decisions—in this case the censorship of music—are supported by Singaporean citizens. In all of 
the articles that mention the petition to ban the concert, the number of signatures in support is 
cited. Furthermore, in two of the nine articles in favor of the ban, the above quote is repeated 
nearly word for word (Hadi 2019b; Ting 2019). The inclusion of Change.org petitions in this 
way demonstrates the goal of the PAP in controlling the narrative behind the banning. The 
regime aims to draw attention to the public support of the petition to illustrate that its policy has 
the support of Singaporeans. However, these articles fail to accurately depict the issue. Instead of 
drawing attention to the debate that took place on Change.org, the opposition that emerged was 
ignored and coverage of it was excluded from The Straits Times.  
Furthermore, in all of the articles in The Straits Times, there is no mention of the core 
argument against the banning put forth in the petitions. The dissenting petition that gained the 
most traction, titled “Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs to reinstate and reschedule Watain 
show,” argued that the cancelling of the show was a “huge setback to Singapore’s democracy 
[and] free speech…” (Lim 2019).  However, in none of the articles is there any mention of the 
fact that the PAP’s policy decision is hampering the free flow of ideas or free speech. In the one 
article that does mention the dissenting petitions, the author states that the petitions simply 
argued that Watain’s license should be reinstated. Not that the petitions argued that the banning 
was indicative of a larger political issue. Thus, in selectively omitting certain petitions and the 
issues that they address, the PAP is able to effectively demonstrate public support for its policy 
without drawing attention to the larger concerns addressed by many Singaporeans. The 




In this section, I explore the implications of the selective inclusion of Change.org 
petitions in The Straits Times. By highlighting supporting petitions and ignoring dissent, the PAP 
is able to implement authoritarian public policy despite Internet technologies allowing for 
democratic practices becoming more apparent. While the band’s license was quickly revoked, 
the regime still needed to justify the banning to the Singaporean public. Through Change.org 
petitions, the PAP was able to create a narrative on The Straits Times that outlined a significant 
support base for the banning. While it may be true that a significant number of Singaporeans 
called for the banning, the coverage on The Straits Times fails to account for any opposition. 
Thus, while Change.org lies outside of the government’s direct control, the regime is still 
able to use the site to advance its authoritarian public policy. The PAP works to bring citizen 
voices in support of the regime to the center of the conversation in The Straits Times, while 
ensuring that those in opposition remain on the side lines. Thus, while Change.org may appear to 
be a tool to uphold democratic values, it can actually be used to enforce centralized power 
structures.  
In revoking Watain’s license, the PAP was able to further regulate the cultural sphere of 
Singapore (Bruthiaux 2010). In this case, the banning of Watain works to govern conduct and 
practice in such a way that enforces a dominant cultural and political ideology (Lee 2010). In 
stepping in to censor content that is deemed to be harmful to the Christian faith, the PAP asserted 
itself as a protector of social and cultural harmony in Singapore (Huat 2003).  Thus, by 
regulating the cultural sphere, the government was able to present itself as a necessary force to 
ensure the longevity of Singapore as a nation (Huat 2003; Lee 2010). However, this action was 
met with resistance and criticism. When this criticism emerged on Change.org the government is 
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left with relatively little option to regulate or censor its content. Thus, it utilizes The Straits 
Times, a site over which it has no control, to ensure that Singaporean’s are unaware of dissenting 
petitions and fully aware of supporting petitions. This allows the PAP to advance a policy agenda 
that reinforces its authoritarian power. 
It is also important to remember that The Straits Times has long been known to tailor 
content to support the PAP (“Global Intelligence Files” 2010; Mydans 2011; “Associated Press” 
2017). The difference here is that the regime is able to use potentially democratic tools in 
strategic ways to highlight support and stifle dissent. In capitalizing on the hyper-connected, and 
seemingly democratic nature of tools such as Change.org, the PAP is able to create an image 
surrounding its public policy that appears as though it is founded on public support. The reality, 
however, is that far more debate exists. Still, this debate is often pushed to the margins, outside 
of popular media. When mention of the petition emerges on The Straits Times, dissenting voices 
are left out of the conversation. While Change.org remains open and accessible to any 
Singaporean Internet user, its reach is far weaker than the top headline on The Straits Times’ 
website. Thus, what emerges is a system in which the PAP does not need to regulate the 
increasingly public sphere outside of its political reach. Rather, it can allow for both support and 
dissent to grow outside of the spotlight, while only bringing the former into public view.  
Whereas previously, bias in media generally centered on extreme statements that 
appealed to emotion more than reason (Kaisler & O’Connor 2019), the pro-PAP rhetoric in The 
Straits Times is now able to cite a specific number of supporters that agree with a given policy 
decision. In doing so, the PAP is able to effectively argue that the banning was, in fact, a 
reasonable decision as it came from the will of the people. However, in exploring the banning on 
a deeper level, it becomes clear that significant voices did oppose the decision. In choosing to 
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omit these voices from the popular narrative put forth on The Straits Times, the PAP 
marginalized dissent and asserted its authority to control the public debate. 
Furthermore, the bottom-up approach to creating petitions on Change.org, wherein issues 
of import are decided by netizens, can be viewed as an ideal scenario for the regime. That is, if 
the regime were to regulate Change.org it would be limited to the creativity of government 
employees when determining policy direction. Instead, the regime can utilize the power of 
netizen engagement to find new ways to enforce authoritarian public policy. As is further 
explored in Chapter V, by giving Singaporeans individual agency to engage with public policy in 
an open space, the PAP can defer the act of policy advancement to netizens. In this sense, the 
PAP understands that the aim is not necessarily to control netizen engagement in the 21st century, 
but rather to channel its power in ways that are favorable to the regime. 
The result of only highlighting support for authoritarian public policy is that government 
action does not appear to be in conflict with the will of Singaporean citizens, but rather in 
support. Both The Straits Times and Change.org play crucial roles in advancing the regime’s 
policy agendas. There is no overt censorship of Change.org by the PAP, nor are there any reports 
that the Singaporean government artificially creates petitions to manufacture popular support. 
Rather, the PAP can utilize The Straits Times to selectively highlight petitions that already exist. 
Thus, the PAP can channel netizen engagement to produce outcomes favorable to the regime. 
The power of Change.org’s unregulated and decentralized nature is thus conditional on the use 
of The Straits Times. As discussed throughout this thesis, connected netizens now hold a new 
power to challenge institutional and centralized power through the Internet. Thus, in order to 
maintain power, authoritarian governments must channel a decentralized base of citizens to 
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maintain power. One avenue through which the Singaporean government does this is by bringing 
attention to examples of popular support for authoritarian public policy while excluding dissent. 
IV. Conclusion 
The relationship between the PAP, The Straits Times and Change.org, illustrates the 
ways in which an authoritarian government can capitalize on connective Internet tools to 
advance public policy. In a seemingly contradictory way, a tool that aims to give everyone a 
voice only empowers those in favor of government policy. Thus, dissenting voices continue to be 
marginalized. By capitalizing on its control of The Straits Times, the People’s Action Party is 
able to use the hyper-connectivity of the Internet to strengthen its authoritarian policies. In doing 
so, the PAP can point to definitive support for its public policy decisions. However, these policy 
decisions are still met with significant dissent. Yet those expressing their dissent are left out of 
the mainstream narrative the government attempts to put forth. The result is a system in which 
the PAP can use Change.org to advance its own authoritarian policy. In the following chapter, I 
continue my analysis of Change.org and The Straits Times and incorporate the Internet tool 
STOMP (discussed in Chapter III) to show that these tools do not operate separately from each 
other. Rather, they all work in lockstep to advance the authoritarian regimes public policy 







Chapter V- Creating and Capitalizing on User Participation 
I. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I explored STOMP, Change.org, and The Straits Times in 
order to understand their use as tools for policy advancement in different contexts. In Chapter III, 
I analyzed the ways that the PAP can artificially create instances of popular engagement online 
through English as it is Broken, in order to advance the Speak Good English Movement. In 
Chapter IV, I analyzed the ways that the PAP was able to channel the power of netizen 
engagement outside of its direct control through The Straits Times and Change.org with the 
banning of Watain.  
In this chapter, I trace the PAP’s utilization of STOMP, Change.org and The Straits 
Times to control the political narrative surrounding the decision to ban personal mobility devices 
(PMDs)— or e-Scooters, e-Unicycles, and e-Skateboards— from footpaths in Singapore. I 
combine the concepts developed in the two previous chapters to demonstrate that these tactics for 
advancing authoritarian public policy do not exist in isolation. Instead, each site plays a distinct 
role, working in lockstep with others to advance the PAP’s authoritarian policy agenda. With this 
analysis, I seek to answer the question of why the PAP is able to continue to advance an 
authoritarian policy agenda despite emerging Internet technologies allowing for increased 
netizen participation. I argue that the PAP uses all three sites together to create an effective tool 
for online policy advancement. As I explore, each site serves its own purpose for policy 
advancement; The Straits Times and Change.org are used to tailor pre-existing popular support 
to fit the regime, and STOMP is used to generate support. Furthermore, when the PAP chooses 
to engage in policy action, each site suddenly becomes a tool for policy advancement at the same 
time. In looking at a specific moment when the PAP chooses to enact new policy—in this case 
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the banning of PMDs—I aim to show the interconnected nature of the sites as tools for PAP 
policy advancement. 
On November 5, 2019, the PAP implemented a new law on the use of personal mobility 
devices in Singapore. Whereas previously, PMDs were allowed on both biking paths and 
footpaths, in November the PAP decided to ban PMDs from footpaths, allowing them to only be 
used in bike lanes (Wei 2019a). This policy decision emerged after a woman named Ong Bee 
Eng was killed when an e-scooter collided with her on a biking path (Yong 2019). While Ong’s 
death signifies the initial discussion to ban PMDs in popular media in Singapore, as I explore, a 
call to regulate the use of PMDs existed on Change.org well before the PAP decided to engage 
in new policy initiatives. However, this call largely existed in the periphery of the Internet, 
outside of popular view. It was not until after the government decided to ban PMDs that popular 
support was highlighted online through The Straits Times. In a similar sense, articles can be 
found on STOMP that reinforce the PAP’s stance of PMD regulation before Ong’s death. The 
articles work to reinforce PAP policy by contrasting dangerous PMD driving (often the subject 
of STOMP articles) with the government’s policy stance. This comparison places the regime as 
the protector of safety in Singapore, and those who break the rules as dangerous to the safety of 
others. After Ong’s death, articles on STOMP reinforcing PAP policy saw a significant spike in 
number. Thus, the online discussion surrounding the regulation of PMDs on each site before and 
after Ong’s death is the focus of this chapter. I aim to show that the PAP uses each site in 
specific ways and at specific moments to advance PAP policy. 
The decision to ban PMDs is the focus of this chapter as it exemplifies the regime’s 
attempts to maintain authoritarian power in the age of increased interconnectedness and 
globalization. As scholars (Wong & Huang 2010) argue, the PAP has maintained political 
69 
 
legitimacy despite economic liberalization and globalization in part due to a relationship between 
citizens and the regime wherein the latter provides safety and security in return for receiving 
political legitimacy. This exchange relation, which I refer to as the security-legitimacy 
relationship, is the basis for the PAP’s ability to maintain authoritarian power (Wong & Huang 
2010). In the case of banning PMDs, Ong’s death raised questions concerning the safety of 
PMDs (Yong 2019). On this basis, the security legitimacy relationship began to weaken. In order 
to remain in power, the PAP began to reassure citizens’ safety concerns. While on the surface, 
this may appear to be an example of citizen action overpowering authoritarian governance, as I 
explore below, the regime did not give into popular support, nor did it enact policy that would 
prevent deaths like Ong’s from occurring in the future. This suggests that the PAP’s main 
priority was reassuring pedestrian safety in Singapore and mending the security-legitimacy 
relationship in order to maintain power. 
Furthermore, the decision to ban PMDs is an example of authoritarian policy as it reflects 
a new approach to enacting policy that the PAP has taken in the 21st century. To elaborate, the 
2011 elections in Singapore posed serious threat to the regime’s political power (Ong & Tim 
2011; Tan 2014). For the first time since the PAP took power, it appeared as though the nation 
was shifting towards liberal democracy (Ong & Tim 2011). However, the PAP did not simply 
yield its ground to democratic transitions (Tan 2014). Instead, the regime adopted new methods 
for finding solutions to policy problems to account for a newly mobilized electorate (Ong & Tim 
2011; Tan 2014). Indeed, many of the previously successful tools for policy advancement 
became detrimental under current circumstances (Tan 2014). For example, previously the PAP 
would engage in policy overhauls wherein dramatic changes to public policy would be made. 
This strategy has been viewed as too blunt in the face of a new, more mobilized mass of 
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Singaporeans (Tan 2014). One way that the government has attempted to alter its engagement 
with public policy is to take a risk averse, more cautious tweaking of existing policy (Tan 2014). 
The approach to policy advancement that the PAP has taken is reflected in the government’s 
approach to banning PMDs. Rather than give into the initial calls to ban PMDs in their entirety, 
the government took less harsh approaches in order to attempt to strengthen the security-
legitimacy relationship in a risk averse fashion that allowed it to maintain centralized power. 
In this sense, at first glance that PAP’s decision to ban PMDs may appear as though it is 
indicative of a larger trend of popular support overpowering authoritarian governance in 
Singapore. However, the government’s policy approach dos not reflect popular support, nor does 
it effectively address the issue of citizen safety from PMDs. The ban from footpaths did nothing 
to prevent Ong’s death from occurring in the future as her death occurred on a bicycle path 
(Yong 2019). This fact, when coupled with data on accident reports in Singapore showing that 
PMD accidents make up roughly 2% of land vehicle collisions in 2018 (PMDs, bicycles, 
motorcycles, and cars), suggests that the Singaporean government aimed to reassure the safety of 
Singaporean citizens following Ong’s death rather than engage in policy decisions that prevented 
future accidents (Wei 2019d). Additionally, of the 299 PMD accidents that occurred in 2018, 
only 8 of those reporting injuries were pedestrians (Wei 2019d). Based off of this data, the 
decision to ban PMDs appears more so as a policy decision to mend the security-legitimacy 
relationship rather than to definitively protect Singaporean citizens. On this basis, it can be 
viewed as an example of authoritarian policy advancement. 
Upon establishing the banning of PMDs as an example of authoritarian policy, I now 
illustrate how I will explore the regime’s attempts to utilize sites that appear to be founded on 
netizen engagement to advance such policy. In order to explore how the PAP is able to advance 
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its policy concerning PMDs online, I used advanced internet searches to target articles on 
banning PMDs through The Straits Times. The methodology of this search is discussed below. 
A Change.org petition, started by a Singaporean named Zachary Tan in April of 2019, 
called for the banning of PMDs throughout the city-state (Tan 2019). Initially, the petition gained 
9,000 signatures in the first five months. However, as I explore using the Google Custom Search 
REST API—a program that allows one to search for news articles from specific sites 
programmatically—the petition’s representation on The Straits Times was largely distorted. 
Moving beyond this, I trace a series of STOMP articles that illustrate the current regulation of 
PMDs in Singapore. In researching the presentation of PMDs on STOMP, I analyze a series of 
18 articles that demonstratively reinforce the PAP’s regulation of PMDs before and after the 
decision to ban them from footpaths. The connection between each of these articles is mention of 
the Active Mobility Act, a law regulating land vehicle usage in Singapore implemented in 2018 
(“Active Mobility Act” 2019). I thus trace the use of these articles as tools to remind netizens of 
the regulation on PMDs in the city-state. The results of my findings for this chapter are twofold: 
(1) each site serves a specific purpose for authoritarian policy advancement and (2) the sites are 
not consistent PAP policy advancement tools—instead they are utilized at moments when they 
best serve the regime. 
In the following section I trace the use of Change.org, The Straits Times and STOMP in 
advancing the policy surrounding PMDs put forth by the PAP. I have discussed each of these 
sites in detail in previous chapters. As such, I briefly restate their purpose in advancing policy 
here. Change.org is a site that allows netizens to create and sign petitions important to them; it 
operates outside of the direct control of the PAP, and as such contains information in support and 
dissent of the government. The Straits Times is a conventional media outlet in Singapore that 
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puts forth information favorable to the regime (Mydans 2011); the site takes a top-down 
approach to disseminating information wherein stories are created by a team of professional 
journalists, editors and publishers and the information is distributed to Singaporean citizens. 
STOMP operates similarly to The Straits Times in that information is edited to support the 
regime. The difference is that STOMP appears to be founded on a peer-to-peer information 
sharing network. In this way, STOMP acts as a tool for artificially generating popular support for 
the regime in Singapore (Dearman & Greenfield 2014). As discussed below, each site plays a 
crucial role in advancing PAP public policy. 
II. A Case Study on Personal Mobility Devices 
In this section, I analyze the interconnected nature of STOMP, Change.org and The 
Straits Times in advancing PAP public policy. Each site plays a distinct role in catalyzing 
popular support for the regime. Furthermore, the movements in which they are used 
demonstrates the interconnected nature of each site in advancing authoritarian public policy. 
Here, I focus on a specific example of PAP public policy wherein the regime banned the use of 
personal mobility devices (PMDs) on walking paths throughout the city-state. As previously 
stated, the decision to ban PMDs emerged after the death of a Singaporean woman named Ong 
Bee Eng on September 25, 2019 (Han & Wei 2019). Ong died of injuries after she collided with 
an e-scooter while riding her bicycle (Yong 2019). The decision to ban electric vehicles from 
footpaths came as a result of increased fear for the safety of pedestrians after Ong’s death (Wei 
2019a). In this sense, the decision can be viewed as an example of authoritarian public policy as 
it reflects the PAP’s attempts to strengthen the security-legitimacy relationship in moments when 
the relation is most vulnerable (Wong & Huang 2010). Throughout this section, I explore the use 
of STOMP, The Straits Times, and Change.org in drawing public support for the regime’s 
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decision to ban PMDs. As I show, before Ong’s death, the sites were not used to highlight 
popular support for the banning of PMDs, despite the presence of strong online discussion 
surrounding their regulation (Tan 2019). However, after Ong’s death, each site suddenly became 
a tool for advancing authoritarian public policy nearly instantaneously. The ways in which the 
PAP utilized online tools facilitating netizen engagement to garner support for this policy 
decision is the basis for this section. 
In the case of banning PMDs in Singapore, the death of Ong catalyzed a fear about 
security among citizens. On this basis, the PAP acted in order to ensure that the relationship 
between the regime and its citizens remained stable. The PAP quickly put forth a series of 
regulations on the use of PMDs in Singapore that eventually culminated in the banning of the 
devices from footpaths throughout the nation. However, the decision to ban PMDs from 
footpaths did little to prevent instances like Ong’s death from occurring in the future as the 
accident occurred on a biking path—an area where PMDs were still allowed (Yong 2019). Thus, 
it follows that the decision to ban PMDs from footpaths emerged to reassure the safety of 
Singaporean citizens, rather than to legitimately prevent the conditions that lead to Ong’s death 
from occurring in the future. The decision also reflects the risk averse approach to policy 
advancement taken by the PAP since the 2011 elections (Tan 2014). However, in order to ensure 
that the narrative surrounding the PAP’s policy decisions remained in its favor, the regime 
utilized The Straits Times, Change.org, and STOMP to illustrate and create instances of popular 
support. In exploring the sites in this way, I aim to understand how the PAP is able to control the 





The Straits Times and Change.org 
This section follows a Change.org petition that calls for the banning of PMDs and its 
coverage on The Straits Times. The petition was created in April of 2019, 5 months before Ong’s 
death (Wei 2019c) and called for the banning of PMDs throughout all of Singapore (Tan 2019). 
In working to understand the ways in which the PAP uses netizen engagement to advance its 
public policy agenda, I first trace the portrayal of the petition before and after the death of Ong 
Bee Eng. In doing so, I trace the use of the petition as a tool to illustrate popular support for the 
regime’s policy decisions, despite the petition calling for action  that the government refused to 
take— that is, the banning of PMDs in their entirety from Singapore (Wei & Teh 2019). What I 
find is that the regime uses the petition to draw attention to public support for the regime’s policy 
on The Straits Times, without directly enacting the policy that the petition calls for. 
I used the Google Custom Search API to scan the Internet for Straits Times articles 
discussing the petition online. The search is generated using a cURL2 command containing three 
parameters: (1) a custom generated site key, restricting all responses returned to The Straits 
Times website (www.straitstimes.com), (2) the keywords used to conduct the search, and (3) a 
date restriction limiting all responses to the year 2019— when the discussion of banning PMDs 
was most politically salient. In conducting this research, I generated two separate cURL 
searches, each with separate keywords. The first search was generated using the keywords 
“PMD” and “Change.org;” the second search used the keywords “PMD” and “Petition.” Thus, 
the searches returned two separate responses, each with articles from The Stratis Times in 2019 
containing the keywords “PMD” and “Change.org” or “PMD” and “Petition”. Because The 
                                                          
2 cURL is a software project run from the command-line that allows users to send and receive data using various 
network protocols. In essence, the program allows users to generate a call and receive a response using URL syntax, 
but from the command-line (Stenberg). 
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Straits Times always abbreviates the term “Personal Mobility Device” to “PMD” there was no 
need to include the extended phrase in these queries. The search returned a total of eight articles 
that are discussed in detail below. 
In April of 2019, a Singaporean Zachary Tan created a Change.org petition titled 
“Banning of PMD / e-bike in Singapore” (Tan 2019). The online petition called for the complete 
banning of e-scooters, e-bikes and other personal mobility devices from being used anywhere in 
Singapore. Stating the risks of using PMDs, Tan argued that the devices were capable of moving 
too fast and were too hard to hear when approaching, making them a danger to Singaporean 
citizens. The 1,200 word petition argued that PMDs presented a strong risk to pedestrian safety 
in Singapore and as such should be banned in their entirety (Tan 2019). Despite gaining over 
9,000 signatures in the first five months—an similar amount to that obtained by Watain—the 
petition was not acknowledged on The Straits Times before Ong’s death at all. This is likely due 
to the fact that there had not been a specific event that brought the issue of PMD safety into the 
public eye. In essence, the PAP felt no strong need to acknowledge the petition as the current use 
of PMDs didn’t threaten security and thus presented no threat to the regimes authoritarian power. 
Thus, despite holding significant support for the banning of PMDs, the PAP allowed the petition 
to live in the margins of the Internet, outside of popular view. Such an ability to ignore petitions 
in this way suggests that the PAP is able to utilize tools that facilitate democracy at selective 
moments when drawing support for autocratic public policy becomes necessary.  
However, after Ong’s death, the Change.org petition—now five months old— saw a 
significant spike in the number of signatures, growing to over 30,000 by the end of September of 
2019 (Wei 2019c). This spike indicates a heightened sense of fear for the safety of Singaporeans 
and shows that the security-legitimacy relationship was under stress (Wong & Huang 2010). 
76 
 
Thus, the PAP was required to act in order to maintain power. In this way, the petition acted as 
an indicator of the steps that the regime needed to take in order to maintain authoritarian power 
in Singapore. Because people called for increased security, the regime was no longer required to 
determine the course of action it needed to take in order to maintain power. Instead, it could rely 
on citizen participation to feed the regime with new information that could then be utilized to 
advance its authoritarian power.  
However, the PAP explicitly stated that it had no intention of fully banning the use of 
PMDs throughout the city-state (Wei & Teh 2019). Instead the regime attempted to engage in 
other, less strict policy initiatives to strengthen the security-legitimacy relationship between 
citizens and government. These regulations included a minimum age to purchase a PMD, and the 
implementation of a PMD drivers test (Yong 2019). The reason that the PAP did not want to 
completely ban PMDs could be due to the fact that they had already become too prominent in 
Singapore, or that certain occupations (like delivery drivers) had become dependent on them for 
their livelihood (Wei 2019c). Regardless of the reason, the PAP explicitly stated that it would not 
implement a full ban of PMDs as the petition called for (Wei & Teh 2019). As I explore below, 
the fact that the PAP had no intention of fully banning PMDs did not stop them from using the 
petition as an example of popular support for regime policy. Instead, the PAP highlighted the 
petition on The Straits Times in order to advance other forms of public policy. 
As previously stated, the PAP used the Change.org petition to illustrate popular support 
for the regime’s public policy through The Straits Times. In the two months following Ong’s 
death, when the discussion to ban PMDs was at its height, the petition was mentioned in eight 
articles on The Straits Times. Each article mentions the petition and the number of signatures that 
it gained. Additionally, many of the articles also include a policy decision taken by the PAP to 
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ensure the safety of Singaporean citizens. That is to say, the decision to ban PMDs from 
footpaths was not the first policy initiative that the government enacted to ensure the security of 
Singaporeans. One article titled “Man dies after falling off e-scooter in Tanah Merah Coast 
Road” discusses Ong’s death and its instigation of a larger call for government regulation (Yong 
2019). The article states the following: 
On Tuesday morning, the online petition had about 9,000 signatures, but the number 
grew to more than 50,000 by 5pm on Friday. On Friday, the Active Mobility Advisory 
Panel issued a set of recommendations to the Government to better regulate the riding of 
PMDs. These measures include a minimum age of 16 for PMD riders and a theory test 
that riders have to pass before they are allowed on public paths. Senior Minister of State 
for Transport Lam Pin Min, in a Facebook post, said the Ministry of Transport will study 
these recommendations and provide its response in due course. (Yong 2019) 
In this case, the petition is used for the specific purpose of demonstrating public support for 
increased regulation of PMDs. The decision to regulate PMD use to riders 16 and up, and the 
inclusion of testing to ensure that riders use PMDs safely, signal attempts by the government to 
better regulate PMD use. Both of these policy decisions demonstrate an attempt to legitimize the 
PAP’s power as a safeguard for the security of Singaporean citizens. Furthermore, they reflect 
the PAP’s recent attempts to engage in policy tweaking rather than an overhaul of current 
initiatives (Tan 2014). However, by referencing the online petition, which does not call for either 
of these initiatives but rather the full ban of PMDs, the government strategically uses popular 




 This was not the end of the PAP’s policy engagement with PMDs, however. On 
November 5th, the government decided to ban the use of PMDs from footpaths in Singapore. The 
decision was presented as being the result of Ong’s death (Wei 2019a). However, the accident 
occurred on a bicycle path rather than a footpath (Yong 2019). In this sense, the banning of 
PMDs from footpaths appears to be an attempt to reassure the safety of Singaporean citizens, 
rather than a preventative measure to curb instances similar to Ong’s death from occurring in the 
future. Thus, in this way, the regulation subverted the calls to fully ban the use of PMDs, while 
still attempting to reassure Singaporean’s who felt threatened by the devices. However, the PAP 
still used the petition to advance its policy initiative, despite the signatures calling for different 
action than what the PAP chose to enforce. In this way, Change.org becomes a tool for 
quantifying public support in such a way that goes against the petitioners’ goals. From this, the 
PAP is then able to use the site to advance a policy agenda separate from the will of Singaporean 
citizens while still capitalizing on popular support. 
The ability of the regime to use a Change.org petition to advance a policy agenda 
different from what the supporters called for is further reflected in The Straits Times article titled 
“E-scooter rider charged over Bedok accident that killed cyclist” wherein the petition and Ong’s 
death are both used as justification for the banning (Alkhatib 2019). The article states: 
After [Ong’s death], a petition on change.org calling for the ban of PMDs and e-bikes 
gained traction. As of noon on Monday, it had more than 75,000 signatures... Since Nov 
5, e-scooters have been banned from footpaths (Alkhatib 2019). 
The above quote demonstrates the connection between Ong’s death, the Change.org petition, and 
the decision to ban PMDs from footpaths. However, the petition explicitly calls for the removal 
of all PMDs from Singapore (Tan 2019), not just from footpaths. This difference between the 
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petition and the PAP’s policy agenda is not included in The Straits Times article. Yet still, the 
PAP continues to use the Change.org petition as justification for banning the PMDs from 
footpaths. This suggests that the PAP is working to mend the security-legitimacy relationship 
rather than take action to definitively protect the safety of Singaporeans. With this, it becomes 
clear that The Straits Times not only uses Change.org to selectively highlight instances of 
popular support, but also uses such support to tailor the narrative surrounding public policy to fit 
the regime—even if such support does not reflect the policy taken by the PAP.  
 The above use of a Change.org petition that calls for policy action that the PAP is 
unwilling to take, indicates the regime’s attempts to utilize popular support to put forth an 
authoritarian message. Whereas previously, the PAP would engage in classical authoritarian 
tactics, such as censorship and propaganda, to create a dominant narrative that silenced political 
advocacy that went against the regime’s goals (Tan 2016), in the 21st century the regime can rely 
on citizen support to advance an authoritarian policy agenda. In doing so, the PAP no longer 
needs to work to create a singular truth that reinforces its power (Heimans & Timms 2018). 
Rather it can allow for many ideas to be put forth and strategically tailor them to suit the regime. 
In this sense, the PAP co-opts digital supporters and highlights popular support in order to 
advance authoritarian public policy (Heimans & Timms 2018).  
As the above example indicates, what emerges from the free flow of information sharing 
on Change.org are petitions that actively work to reinforce the PAP’s power. This in turn 
provides the regime with a new body of netizens, capable of feeding the regime with new ways 
of advancing its public policy. Whereas previously, the PAP was limited to its own government 
officials when determining the direction of its public policy, now it can defer action to netizens 
who take party rhetoric and turn it into tools that can actively be utilized to reinforce centralized 
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power. In the case of PMD regulation, the PAP had no use for such a petition as a tool for 
highlighting popular support. However, after Ong’s death, when the question of banning PMDs 
became a matter of public security, the PAP was required to enact policy that re-legitimized its 
ability to ensure the safety of its citizens. In order to ensure that the political narrative 
surrounding this policy decision remained in favor of the PAP, the Change.org petition was 
utilized to illustrate popular support.  
 Here, I have analyzed the ways the PAP is able to utilize netizen engagement on sites 
outside of its control to advance authoritarian public policy. Below, I return to STOMP to 
explore the ways in which the site is able to insert political rhetoric into a site that appears to be 
founded on netizen participation. In looking at Change.org, The Straits Times and STOMP as 
tools for influencing the political narrative surrounding the regulation of PMDs in Singapore, I 
aim to illustrate how each of these sites serve a distinct purpose in advancing authoritarian public 
policy online.  
 
STOMP  
 Here, I explore the PAP’s ability to advance public policy using a peer-to-peer 
information sharing site within its control. As previously stated, STOMP is a site that allows 
netizens to create their own Singaporean news stories. The appearance of STOMP as a site that 
facilitates user participation allows for the perception of peer-to-peer information sharing. 
However, the use of STOMP editors makes the site less of a free market of ideas than it may at 
first appear (Dearman & Greenfield 2014). As previously stated, STOMP’s use of editors creates 
a system wherein user generated stories are tailored to support the regime (Dearman & 
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Greenfield 2014). As I explore, STOMP played a key role in advancing the public policy 
decision to ban PMDs from footpaths. The artificially created, peer-to-peer STOMP information 
network provides the PAP with a seemingly democratic tool that can be used to advance 
authoritarian public policy. As I explore below, the regime capitalizes on STOMP at crucial 
points when controlling the narrative surrounding PAP public policy is most important. This 
tactic is similar to ways that the PAP utilizes The Straits Times and Change.org as discussed 
above. In illustrating the similar tactics that the PAP uses on STOMP, I aim to illustrate how all 
of these sites form an effective tool for PAP policy advancement. 
Below, I trace a series of STOMP articles that discuss the use of PMDs. Each article 
concerns the improper use of PMDs in Singapore both before and after the decision to ban them 
from footpaths. Specifically, each article references the Active Mobility Act (AMA), a 
Singaporean law that provides information as to which vehicles can be used on what paths in the 
city-state (“Active Mobility Act” 2019). The law was created in 2018 by the Land Transport 
Authority, a government department regulating land vehicle usage in Singapore (“Active 
Mobility Act” 2019). I include these articles specifically because they accurately represent the 
relationship between the PAP and STOMP in which the site is used as a tool to highlight regime 
policy. As discussed below, the way that STOMP highlights the Active Mobility Act works to 
strengthen the security-legitimacy relationship in Singapore and thus makes it a powerful tool for 
advancing authoritarian public policy. 
 In order to find all articles in 2019 that mentioned the Active Mobility Act, I created a 
custom Google Search engine that only returns articles from the STOMP website. I then used 
this search engine to programmatically search the STOMP site with the keywords “PMD” and 
“Active Mobility Act” using the Google Custom Search API. The search returned 18 articles 
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from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, the year that the decision to ban PMDs was most 
prominent. Despite the fact that many articles are published across 2019, the language included 
in each is remarkably similar. Each article follows a similar framework wherein a story is posted 
of a PMD rider driving dangerously or otherwise breaking the current law set by the PAP. The 
articles then state “Under the Active Mobility Act (AMA)…” and proceed to indicate the law 
surrounding PMDs that is relevant for the specific article. The formulaic nature of referencing 
the Active Mobility Act suggests that the language is not inserted by netizens who generate 
STOMP articles, but rather by the team of editors working for the company and are closely tied 
to the regime. In this way, the regime is able to use a site that appears to be founded on netizen 
engagement, to advance an authoritarian policy initiative.   
One article, published after the ban of PMDs from footpaths took effect, titled “PMD 
users riding on footpath at Chin Swee Road shows some are still not respecting law” illustrates 
the way the Active Mobility Act is used on STOMP articles (Daley 2019). The article states that 
many PMD users are ignoring the ban on footpaths in Singapore. In the article, the netizen who 
posted the story says “Seeing these people’s indifference to the law is really scary” (Daley 2019). 
This quote is immediately followed with a sentence reinforcing the current regulation of PMDs 
in Singapore: “Under the Active Mobility Act, PMDs are only allowed on cycling and shared 
paths” (Daley 2019). Additionally, the image shown in Figure 5.2 is also included to visually 
demonstrate where PMDs are allowed in Singapore. The image, taken directly from the Land 
Transport Authority’s website, reflects the PAP’s current regulation surrounding PMD usage. 
This image consistently changes to reflect the current stance of the PAP surrounding PMD 
regulation. Figure 5.1 shows the image before the decision to ban PMDs from footpaths; Figure 
5.2 shows the image after the decision. The inclusion of this graphic in STOMP articles both 
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before and after the ban from footpaths indicates the regime’s attempt to reinforce its current 
public policy surrounding PMD usage online. 
 
 
The reference to the Active Mobility Act, and the inclusion of the image, suggests that 
the articles are used to reinforce existing regime policy. However, the formulaic language used 
and the inclusion of the image from the Land Transport Authority’s website suggests that this 
information is not coming from netizens, but rather from STOMP’s editorial board. The result is 
a system wherein information appears to come from a decentralized base of netizens, but in 
reality puts forth information from a centralized, authoritarian power structure. Moreover, the 
dates that the articles were published indicate the regime’s attempts to enforce authoritarian 
public policy at moments when its legitimacy is brought into question. As discussed above, the 
PAP only needed to engage in authoritarian public policy after Ong’s death on September 25, 
Figure 5.1 
PAP policy surrounding PMD 
usage before Nov. 5 ban. 
Figure 5.2 
PAP policy surrounding PMD 
usage after Nov. 5 ban. 
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2019. As I explore below, this was precisely the time when the PAP chose to include its political 
messaging on STOMP.  
Furthermore, while the Active Mobility Act is directly referenced 18 times on STOMP in 
2019, it only appeared in four articles in the nine months before Ong’s death. The remainder of 
the articles were published following her death with the vast majority of posts emerging in 
October and November when the decision to ban PMD use on footpaths was at its height. Figure 
5.3 illustrates the distribution of STOMP articles mentioning the Active Mobility Act from the 
first instance on March 20, 2019 until the end of 2019. Each article also includes a variation of 
the images presented in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.  Figure 5.3 shows a definitive spike in 
articles that mention the Active Mobility Act following Ong’s death on September 25, 2019. In 
the two weeks following, the Active Mobility Act is mentioned four times in separate STOMP 
articles. The trend continues as the discussion to regulate PMDs dominates Singapore’s political 
sphere.  
 




The spike in STOMP articles mentioning the Active Mobility Act illustrates STOMP’s 
use as a tool for reminding Singaporeans of the current regulation of PMDs at a time when the 
discussion is political salient. As stated above, the inclusion of the Active Mobility Act serves 
the purpose of reinforcing an authoritarian policy initiative in the minds of Singaporean netizens. 
The Active Mobility Act was created in 2018 and existed long before Ong’s death. Yet it was not 
regularly included in STOMP articles until after her death. This is likely due to the fact that the 
discussion of regulating PMDs as a matter of public safety was not yet a politically salient issue. 
However, in September of 2019, it became necessary for STOMP to reinforce the current 
regulation of PMDs to strengthen the security-legitimacy relationship. In this way, the PAP was 
able to artificially manufacture popular support for the regime when it was most necessary. By 
referencing the Active Mobility Act and including the images in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, the 
articles affirm the policy decisions of the PAP in a way that appears to be coming from netizens. 
Moreover, this affirmation occurs at specific moments when advancing authoritarian policy is 
most necessary. In manufacturing this support in such a way to appear as though it comes from 
Singaporean netizens, the PAP is able to utilize a site that appears to advance democratic values, 
while reinforcing autocratic public policy. 
Furthermore, the data above indicates that the PAP’s use of STOMP is not a constant 
machine used to reinforce authoritarian public policy. Rather, it can be turned off and on, 
depending on when it serves a political purpose. This sporadic reinforcement of PAP public 
policy reflects the dynamic nature of STOMP as a political tool. The PAP can use STOMP to 
reinforce whatever government policy is most salient at the time. In doing so, the party is able to 
capitalize on the diversity of information posted to STOMP to find articles that advance the 
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specific policy agenda the regime wishes to put forth. The result is a site that feeds the regime 
with a new source of information, provided by netizens, which the PAP can then utilize to 
advance its policy agenda. 
The use of STOMP as a tool for advancing the PAP’s policy decisions surrounding PMD 
regulation reflects an atmosphere wherein a centralized power relies on decentralized tools of 
netizen engagement to advance authoritarian public policy. The use of STOMP articles 
containing mention of the Active Mobility Act highlights the party’s attempts to channel the 
power of netizen engagement to reflect popular support for the party. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of these articles, specifically when the discussion of PMD usage was most salient, reflects the 
PAP’s attempts to tailor popular discussion of regime policy. The regime only attempts to 
control such discussion when the issues are most prominent in the Singaporean political sphere. 
Thus, while the Active Mobility Act existed well before Ong’s death, it served no purpose for the 
regime to draw attention to it. It was not until the question of security emerged surrounding PMD 
use that including this policy initiative on a site enabling netizen engagement was necessary. 
III. Conclusion 
The use of The Straits Times, Change.org, and STOMP to advance the PAP’s policy 
agenda surrounding PMD usage illustrates the interconnected nature of the sites in advancing 
public policy. When viewed in isolation, each site appears to reinforce authoritarian public 
policy in a similar manner to that explored in Chapters III and IV. However, when viewed 
together, the sudden focus on the Change.org petition through The Straits Times, and the 
STOMP articles after Ong’s death indicates that the regime utilizes all three sites to advance 
authoritarian public policy in moments of political importance. 
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Thus, while each site exists separately from the other, the PAP strategically uses all three 
at the same time, when enforcing public policy is most necessary. As demonstrated with the use 
of the Change.org petition on The Straits Times as well as STOMP’s engagement with public 
policy through the Active Mobility Act, the PAP utilizes sites that appear to facilitate democratic 
participation to advance authoritarian public policy at selective moments. In this sense, the 
PAP’s system for advancing public policy online is highly coordinated, with each site playing a 
specific role in illustrating popular support for the regime. This chapter demonstrates that the 
PAP actively engages Change.org, The Straits Times, and STOMP to reinforce authoritarian 














Chapter VI- Concluding Notes 
 The research put forth in the preceding chapters works to provide a framework for 
understanding the ways in which tools that appear to facilitate democratic practices can be used 
to further autocratic power. In working to answer my thesis question of why the PAP is able to 
continue to advance autocratic public policy despite the emergence of new technologies 
facilitating increased political participation online, I have found that the regime is able to create 
and capitalize on instances of popular support that give strength to the party. In a seemingly 
paradoxical way, the PAP is able to capitalize on a decentralized flow of information, facilitated 
through peer-to-peer communication methods, to entrench centralized power. In this way, the 
PAP can build support for new public policy that appears to shift the nature of policy making 
from a vertical, top-down system, to one that operates on a decentralized on horizontal basis. 
 The idea that decentralized communication methods advance centralized power is 
contrary to what scholars (Howard & Muzzamil 2013; Diamond & Plattner 2012) argued at the 
start of the 2010s. After the Arab Spring, many believed that the Internet would facilitate new 
methods of democratic participation that would eventually lead to the downfall of centralized 
power structures (Diamond & Plattner 2012). However, the rise in authoritarian power that 
emerged in the years following the Arab Spring has demonstrated that this is simply not true 
(“Freedom in the World” 2019). Instead, we have come to learn that the Internet is simply a tool, 
which when utilized in a certain way, can lead to democracy or autocracy. In the case of 
Singapore, the regime has been able to capitalize on precisely the same aspects of the Internet 
that scholars (Howard & Muzzamil 2013; Diamond & Plattner 2012) believed would lead to 
democracy—that is, increased political participation and user engagement—to enact 
authoritarian public policy and subsequently legitimize the PAP’s power.  
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 Throughout this thesis, I outline two methods through which the PAP is able to use such 
political participation to advance autocratic power. The first, demonstrated through STOMP, 
works to artificially create instances of popular support. In this way, the regime works to provide 
netizens with an avenue to participate in regime policy. While these avenues may appear trivial, 
they none the less have the effect of furthering authoritarian public policy in meaningful ways. 
The second, demonstrated through Change.org and The Straits Times, works to capitalize on 
examples of pre-existing support for PAP policy outside of popular view. In doing so, the regime 
takes advantage of the multiplicity of ideas that emerge on the Internet and only highlights those 
that demonstrate support for the regime. In coming to understand these two methods for 
advancing public policy in Singapore, I argue that the regime has found a new methodology for 
maintaining authoritarian control that accounts for new Internet technologies.  
 In exploring the PAP’s attempts to advance The Speak Good English Movement through 
English as it is Broken, I discussed the nature of artificially generated political participation. That 
is, the ability of the PAP to create platforms that appear to allow for multiple views to be 
expressed, but instead only show regime support. While addressing the PAP’s banning of 
Watain, I explored how two sites—one that embodies the peer-to-peer nature of sharing 
information (Change.org) and one that takes a top-down approach (The Straits Times)—are 
utilized to selectively illustrate examples of pre-existing popular support for regime public 
policy. Finally, in exploring the PAP’s decision to ban personal mobility devices from footpaths 
in the city-state, I illustrated how both of these methods for policy advancement do not exist in 
isolation, but rather work in lockstep to advance PAP public policy at specific moments. Each 
case employs online tools to advance public policy offline, utilizing 21st century methods to 
maintain centralized power. 
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 In this way, it becomes clear that the PAP is able to maintain power precisely because the 
regime has been able to account for 21st century technologies. In the case of the Arab Spring, 
many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East neglected to account for increased communication 
outside of their direct control (Howard & Muzzamil 2013). This, in turn, allowed decentralized 
communication methods to challenge centralized power structures. However, when regimes are 
able to channel the power of netizen engagement and subsequently use it to their advantage, the 
results can give incredible strength to centralized power.  
 This is not to say, however, that the methods that Singapore employs are translatable to 
other authoritarian regimes. Singapore’s history as a hybrid regime, its position as a 
technologically advanced nation, and its relative size all allow for the ability to utilize online 
democratic tools to advance autocratic powers. The success of such a system in China or Russia, 
for example, where the regimes take different approaches to advancing public policy, remains 
unclear. Thus, in order to understand the power of the Internet in enacting public policy in 
regimes outside of Singapore, further research is required. 
 One thing, however, remains clear: in the digital age, information sharing is key to 
political power. Whether such power lies in the hands of citizens, eager to use it in ways that 
advance democracy, or in the hands of governments and other powerful actors working to use it 
to reinforce their own political objectives, remains unclear. Information sharing is at the center of 
the Internet and the constantly shifting dynamics that govern it have fueled this thesis. The 
Internet is filled with paradoxes. But understanding that it is simply a tool, which can be used to 
facilitate democracy or autocracy, is the key to understanding technological and political systems 
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